Contingent ownership structures are prevalent in joint ventures. This paper o ers an explanation based on the investment incentives provided by such an arrangement. We consider a hold-up problem in which two parties make relationshipspeci c investments sequentially in order to generate a joint surplus in the future. In our model, the following ownership structure implements rst best investments...

Coexistence of Strategic Vertical Separation and Integration by Jos Jansen This paper gives conditions under which vertical separation is chosen by some upstream firms, while vertical integration is chosen by others in the equilibrium of a symmetric model. A vertically separating firm trades off fixed contracting costs against the strategic benefit of writing a (two-part tariff, exclusive deale...

When individual protein components of supramolecular complexes are required for assembly, determining whether they play additional structural or functional roles can be difficult. Removing a protein from the complex after assembly can circumvent this problem. Here, we show that an AAA+ unfoldase/protease can extract an essential assembly protein from the ribosome. Specifically, Mg(2+) depletion...

Should the buyer of a customized good use competitive bidding or negotiation to select a contractor? To shed light on this question, we consider several possible determinants that may influence the choice of auctions versus negotiations. We then examine a comprehensive data set of private sector building contracts awarded in Northern California during the years 1995–2000. The analysis suggestsa...

Shifting of income between the corporate and the personal income tax bases in response to tax incentives is the premise of the literature on taxation and organizational form. Empirical evidence of income shifting is, however, merely circumstantial. Using a unique panel of highfrequency VAT data from Israel, we trace the footprints of income-shifting through incorporation by high-income individu...

For what kind of intermediate input/service do firms often go outsourcing? This paper develops a model of two-stage production in which economies of scope are central to the production of both the intermediate and final good. The model is able to explain the patterns of outsourcing from the degree of product differentiation, economies of scope, and economies of scale in production of the interm...

We construct a model where the equilibrium organization of firms changes as an economy approaches the world technology frontier. In vertically integrated firms, owners (managers) have to spend time both on production and innovation activities, and this creates managerial overload, and discourages innovation. Outsourcing of some production activities mitigates the managerial overload, but create...

Contracts within governance classes, e.g. alliances or supply chain contracts, display a great degree of variation in contractual design. Different propositions have been advanced on the influence of repeated interactions on contractual complexity. In this paper, we explore the alignment between provisions in functional classes and the underlying transaction attributes. The transaction cost imp...

We develop a simple theoretical model of a long term buyer-supplier relationship with non-contractible buyer specific R&D investment, and derive predictions on the effects of trust and competition on suppliers’ investment and buyers’ procurement strategies. We address these issues empirically using unique survey data on individual buyer-supplier relationships in the German automotive industry. ...

Explaining patterns of asset ownership is a central goal of both organizational economics and industrial organization. We develop a model of asset ownership in trucking, which we test by examining how the adoption of different classes of on-board computers (OBCs) between 1987 and 1997 in uenced whether shippers use their own trucks for hauls or contract with for-hire carriers. We Ž nd that OBC...