This paper considers the optimal design of unemployment insurance (UI) within an equilibrium matching framework when wages are determined by strategic bargaining. Unlike the Nash bargaining approach, reducing UI payments with duration is welfare increasing. A co-ordinated policy approach, however, one that chooses job creation subsidies and UI optimally, implies a much greater welfare gain than...

I study the cyclical behavior of an equilibrium search model with endogenous job creation and destruction, with focus on the model’s failure to match the observed cyclical volatility of unemployment. Job creation in the model is influenced by wages in new matches. I summarize microeconometric evidence on wages in new matches and show that the key model elasticities are consistent with the evide...

This paper provides detailed information about spatial interactions in the job creation process in West German regional labor markets. We investigate spatial (auto-) correlations in the matching process of vacancies and unemployed, examine regional hiring patterns, and identify clusters of regions with intense inter-regional matching. An extensive specification analysis illustrates the extent o...