One of the key debates in contemporary epistemology is that between Crispin Wright and John McDowell on the topic of radical scepticism. Whereas both of them endorse a form of epistemic internalism, the very different internalist conceptions of perceptual knowledge that they offer lead them to draw radically different conclusions when it comes to the sceptical problem. The aim of this paper is ...

This article summarizes six conceptual dimensions that underlie common assumptions about what counts as an adequate category of psychiatric disorder. These dimensions are 1) causalism-descriptivism, 2) essentialism-nominalism, 3) objectivism-evaluativism, 4) internalism-externalism, 5) entities-agents, and 6) categories-continua. Four different versions of the medical model are described and co...

Just how far can externalism go? In this exciting new book Ruth Millikan explores a radically externalist treatment of empirical concepts. For the last thirty years philosophy of mind’s ties to meaning internalism have been loosened. The theory of content has swung uncomfortably on its moorings in a fickle current, straining against opposing ties to mind and world. In this book Millikan casts c...

Throughout much of the modern period, the human mind has been regarded as a property of the brain and therefore something confined to the inside of the head—a view commonly known as ‘internalism’. But recent works in cognitive science, philosophy, and anthropology, as well as certain trends in the development of technology, suggest an emerging view of the mind as a process not confined to the b...

Optimising the 4E (embodied-embedded-extendedenactive) revolution in cognitive science minimally requires the robust rejection of two guiding commitments made by orthodox thinking in the field, namely (i) an internalism about the whereabouts of our cognitive architecture, and (ii) the principle that intelligent thought and action are standardly to be explained in terms of the building and manip...

The extended mind thesis claims that a subject’s sometimes encompasses the environmental props subject interacts with while solving cognitive tasks. Recently, debate over has been focused on Markov Blankets: statistical boundaries separating biological systems from environment. Here, I argue such focus is mistaken, because Blankets neither adjudicate, nor help us whether true. To do so, briefly...

Modal dualism is the claim that there a space of epistemically possible worlds exceeds metaphysically worlds. In present paper, I argue modal false. do so via an argument differs from most previous arguments against in it does not rely on controversial semantic or epistemological assumptions like descriptivism, internalism rationalism. The point my is, instead, internally inconsistent because r...

Abstract The paper argues that natural language quantification, as expressed by determiner phrases, is not polysemous. foil for this claim Hofweber (Ontology and the ambitions of metaphysics. Oxford University Press, 2016; Mind, 128:699–734, 2019), who contends quantification polysemous between a domain reading an inferential reading. thesis intended to support more general division externalist...

The field of intellectual property (IP) law today is focused, as the name itself advertises, on one particular institutional approach to scientific and cultural production: IP. When legal scholars explain this focus, they typically do so with reference to the virtues of price. Because price gives us a decentralized way to link social welfare to the production of information, IP is alleged to be...