Takeover target firms covered by more equity analysts are sold for higher premiums while their acquirers earn lower merger announcement returns. We confirm these results using exogenous shocks to coverage arising from brokerage-house mergers or closures (i.e., quasi-natural experiments) as instruments for the loss of analyst coverage. In general, our findings indicate that target coverage by eq...

This paper investigates how ownership changes affect the plant performance, focusing on the cotton spinning industry in early twentieth century Japan, where many plants experienced ownership changes. Through analyses of detailed plant-level data, it is revealed that, after ownership changes, plants tended to focus on low grade and low price products and, at the same time, total factor productiv...

We use a model of mean-shifting investment technologies to study the relationship between market structure, risk taking and social welfare in lending markets. Introduction of loan market competition is shown to reduce lending rates and to generate higher investments without increasing the equilibrium bankruptcy risk of borrowers. Hence, there need not be a tradeo€ between lending market competi...

We use a bargaining framework to examine empirically the relations between director compensation and board-of-director independence. Our evidence suggests that independent directors have a bargaining advantage over the CEO that results in compensation more closely aligned with shareholders’ objectives. Firms with more outsiders on their boards award directors more equity-based compensation. Whe...

We propose a model of investment, duration, and exit strategies for start-ups backed by venture capital (VC) funds that accounts for the high level of uncertainty, the asymmetry of information between insiders and outsiders, and the discount rate. Our analysis predicts that start-ups backed by corporate VC funds remain for a longer period of time before exiting and receive larger investment amo...

A manager’s shareholders, board of directors, and potential future employers are continually assessing his ability. A rich literature has documented that this insight has profound implications for corporate governance because assessment generates incentives (good and bad), introduces assorted risks, and affects the various battles that rage among the relevant actors for corporate control. Conse...

Do labor regulations influence the reaction of stock markets and firm profitability to cross-border acquisitions? We discover that acquiring firms enjoy smaller abnormal stock returns and profits when targets are in countries with stronger labor protection regulations, i.e., in countries where laws, regulations, and policies increase the costs to firms of adjusting their workforces. These effec...

We ask how to regulate pecuniary private benefit consumption. These benefits can compensate controlling shareholders for monitoring managers and investing effort in implementing projects. Controlling shareholders may consume excessive benefits, however. We argue (a) ex post judicial review of controlled transactions dominates ex ante restrictions on the controlled structures: the latter elimina...

Acquirer cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) have been investigated intensively for more than three decades. CARs measure shareholders’ wealth changes conditional upon a deal announcement. The unconditional acquirer shareholders’ expected profit is, however, the product of the acquirer’s CAR and the probability of making the acquisition. This probability element has been mostly overlooked in the...

We use text-based analysis of 10-K product descriptions to examine whether firms exploit product market synergies through asset complementarities in mergers and acquisitions. Transactions are more likely between firms that use similar product market language. Transaction stock returns, ex post cash flows, and growth in product descriptions all increase for transactions with similar product mark...