Particularly socially influential individuals are present in many groups [1-8], but it is unclear whether their emergence is determined by their social influence versus the social susceptibility of others [9]. The social spider Stegodyphus dumicola shows regional variation in apparent leader-follower dynamics. We use this variation to evaluate the relative contributions of leader social influen...

In this paper, there are two competitors in a planar market. The first competitor, called, the leader, opens p new facilities. After that, the second competitor, the follower, reacts to the leader’s action and opens r new facilities. The leader and the follower have got some facilities in advance in this market. The optimal locations for leader and follower are chosen among predefined candidate...

In this paper, the optimal adaptive leader-follower consensus of linear continuous time multi-agent systems is considered. The error dynamics of each player depends on its neighbors’ information. Detailed analysis of online optimal leader-follower consensus under known and unknown dynamics is presented. The introduced reinforcement learning-based algorithms learn online the approximate solution...

Socio-cognitive approaches to leadership study remain the frontrunner in research; this study presents a model, which shows the quality of coworker exchange and organizational hope significantly influence workplace empowerment. The mode clearly presents the power of reciprocal behavior from leader influence tactic and statistical significance of coworker exchange quality, which responds as an i...

The multiobjective optimization of Slide-o-Cam is reported in this paper. Slide-o-Cam is a cam mechanism with multiple rollers mounted on a common translating follower. This transmission provides pure-rolling motion, thereby reducing the friction of rack-and-pinions and linear drives. A Pareto frontier is obtained by means of multiobjective optimization. This optimization is based on three obje...

We consider a Stackelberg game in a network, where a leader minimizes the cost of interdicting arcs and a follower seeks the shortest distance between given origin and destination nodes under uncertain arc traveling cost. In particular, we consider a risk-averse leader, who aims to keep high probability that the follower’s traveling distance is longer than a given threshold, interpreted by a ch...

Proof of Proposition 4.1. We begin allowing a MPE in mixed strategies. When the leader meets follower i in state m, she makes an offer p(m) with probability γm ∈ [0, 1]. The follower accepts the offer with probability αm ∈ [0, 1]. Note that the follower i meeting the leader in state m accepts only if δwout(m−1)+p(m) ≥ δw(m), and accepts with probability one if this inequality holds strictly. No...

In Stackelberg games, a “leader” player first chooses a mixed strategy to commit to, then a “follower” player responds based on the observed leader strategy. Notable strides have been made in scaling up the algorithms for such games, but the problem of finding optimal leader strategies spanning multiple rounds of the game, with a Bayesian prior over unknown follower preferences, has been left u...

In this paper, leader–follower coordination problems of a kind of heterogeneous multi-agent systems are studied by applying iterative learning control (ILC) scheme in a repeatable control environment. The heterogeneous multi-agent systems are composed of first-order and second-order dynamics in two aspects. The leader is assumed to have second-order dynamics and the trajectories of the leader a...