The unprecedented growth of demand for charging electric vehicles (EVs) calls novel expansion solutions to today’s networks. Riding on the wave proliferation sharing economy, Airbnb-like charger markets open opportunity expand existing networks without requiring costly and time-consuming infrastructure investments, yet successful design such relies innovations at interface between game theory, ...

A Continuous Double Auction (CDA) is a powerful auction mechanism used in online share trading. A CDA has many buyers and sellers continually exchanging items. Implementing an online CDA in software is more complicated than a regular online auction (such as eBay). This paper describes our experiences with implementing an online CDA. We present the model as an abstraction of the online share tra...

Online auction fraud is currently the number one Internet fraud. This is partially because traditional auction mechanisms fail to accommodate new perspectives of the Internet. For instance, the Generalized Vickrey Auction (GVA) for multi-unit auctions is no longer incentive compatible under buyer false-name bidding; a buyer may reduce his payment by splitting a single legitimate bid for a large...

We investigate double-auction (DA) market behavior under traders with different degrees of rationality (intelligence or cognitive ability). The rationality of decision making is implemented using genetic programming (GP), where each trader evolves a population of strategies to conduct an auction. By assigning the GP traders different population sizes to differentiate their cognitive ability, th...

—This paper investigates the problem of proportionally fair double-sided energy auction involving buying and selling agents. The grid is assumed to be operating under islanded mode. A distributed auction algorithm that can be implemented by an aggregator, as well as a possible approach by which the agents may approximate price anticipation is considered. Equilibrium conditions arising due to pr...

This paper inquires about the ability of double auction institutions to aggregate information in the context of a " common value " information structure that is known to produce the winner's curse in sealed bid environments. While many fundamental features of the economic environment are different from those studied in the context of sealed bids, the pattern of information distributed to the po...