We study the optimal design of mechanisms for the private provision of public goods in a simple setting in which donors compete for a prize of commonly known value. The optimal mechanism in this model is the lowest-price all-pay auction – a mechanism in which the highest bidder wins but all bidders pay the lowest bid. The highest amount for the public good is generated in the unique, symmetric,...

Many practical experiments on mixtures (where the components sum to one) include additional lower or upper bounds on components, or on linear combinations of them. Usually theory cannot be used to obtain a good design, and algorithmic methods are necessary. Some of the available methods are discussed. Their performance is evaluated on some examples, and the form of the optimal design is investi...

Packet level measurement is now critical to many aspects of broadband networking, e.g. for guaranteeing Service Level Agreements, facilitating measurement-based admission control algorithms, and performing network tomography. Because it is often impossible to measure all the data passing across a network, the most widely used method of measurement works by injecting probe packets. The probes pr...

This paper presents an approach to the optimal fixed experimental design for pair-wise metric conjoint studies. We first propose a linear model suitable for metric paired comparison conjoint analysis. Following Bayesian decision theory, optimal design problems in pairwise metric conjoint analysis is then formally defined. Given the formal definition of the experimental design problems, algorith...