I finally turn to an all too cursory discussion of the application of the foregoing considerations to the identity thesis. Identity theorists have been concerned with several distinct types of identifications: of a person with his body, of a particular sensation (or event or state of having the sensation) with a particular brain state (Jones's pain at 06:00 was his C-fiber stimulation at that t...

Dieser Artikel kontrastiert die thomistischen und cartesianischen Antworten auf die Frage, worin die substantielle Einheit von Körper und Geist bestehen kann. Eine detaillierte Diskussion der thomistischen Theorie der substantiellen Einheit von Körper und Geist identifiziert insbesondere solche Prinzipien des vorausgesetzten hylomorphistischen metaphysischen Hintergrunds dieser Theorie, die Des...

Substance dualism says that all thinking beings are immaterial. This sits awkwardly with the fact requires an intact brain. Many dualists say bodily activity is causally necessary for thinking. But if a material thing can cause thinking, why can’t it think? No argument dualism, however convincing, answers this question, leaving more to explain than their opponents.