This paper analyzes optimal contracts in a linear hidden-action model with normally distributed returns possessing two moments that are governed jointly by two agents, who can observe each others’ effort levels and draft enforceable side–contracts on chosen effort levels and realized returns. After showing that standard constraints, resulting in incentive–contracts, may fail to ensure implement...

contracts sometimes disband to different reasons. one of contracts disbanding causation is resolutory condition. on this base parties stipulate if incident, act or omission arise contract disband. at this face contract disband with acquirement condition on it. in such cases dissolution ground is willing and consequence appears automatically. in truth resolutory condition there is doubt that wit...

In this paper we develop methods to investigate the efficiency of alternative contracts for Carbon (C) sequestration in cropland soils, taking into account the spatial heterogeneity of agricultural production systems and the costs of implementing more efficient contracts. We describe contracts being proposed for implementation in the United States and other countries that would pay farmers for ...

This paper considers coercion contracts in voting systems with end-to-end (E2E) verifiability. Contracts are a set of instructions that an adversary can dictate to a voter, either through duress or by offering payment, that increase the probability of a compliant voter constructing a vote for the adversary’s preferred candidate. Using a representative E2E system, we place the attacks in game-th...

In the evolving context of distributed ledger technologies, standardization smart contracts is necessary. Smart are tamper-proof computer programs. Due to their security and flexibility, it possible exploit in a wide variety use cases. particular, could be automate legally recognized by leveraging contracts. To this extent, some standards regarding proper management surging. However, there stil...

We construct an optimizing-agent model of a closed economy which is simple enough that we can use it to make exact utility calculations. There is a stabilization problem because there are one-period nominal contracts for wages, or prices, or both and shocks that are unknown at the time when contracts are signed. We evaluate alternative monetary policy rules using the utility function of the rep...