Combinatorial auctions play a key role in distributed AI as a mechanism for efficiently allocating resources or tasks, both for cooperative and competitive scenarios. The complexity of the general problem has lead to interest in finding efficient algorithms for useful instances. Tennenholtz introduced an approach which finds polynomial solutions for certain classes of combinatorial auctions by ...

Combinatorial auctions have been used in procurement markets with economies of scope. Preference elicitation is already a problem in single-unit combinatorial auctions, but it becomes prohibitive even for small instances of multiunit combinatorial auctions, as suppliers cannot be expected to enumerate a sufficient number of bids that would allow an auctioneer to find the efficient allocation. A...

This paper presents an approximate algorithm for the winner determination problem in combinatorial auctions, which is based on limited discrepancy search (LDS). Internet auctions have become an integral part of Electronic Commerce and can incorporate largescale, complicated types of auctions including combinatorial auctions, where multiple items are sold simultaneously and bidders can express c...

HARISH G KAMMANAHALLI. Effects of Approximation on an Iterative Combinatorial Auction. (Under the direction of Dr Ṗeter Wurman.) Combinatorial auctions are a promising way of solving the complicated heterogeneous resource allocation problem. However combinatorial auctions present inherently hard computational problems for agents and auctioneers. In particular (1) the auction must solve the winn...

Many auctions involve the sale of a variety of distinct assets. Examples are airport time slots, delivery routes and furniture. Because of complementarities (or substitution effects) between the different assets, bidders have preferences not just for particular items but for sets or bundles of items. For this reason, economic efficiency is enhanced if bidders are allowed to bid on bundles or co...

This paper contains the description of experiments done so far in the combinatorial auction scenario. We describe the computee side and the society side. In this context we introduce also external objects providing services to the computees themselves, and in particular implementing a complex optimization algorithm. Experimental results are given for a traditional combinatorial auction and for ...

This survey considers the following setting. A seller wants to sell a set of indivisible goods. A set of buyers are interested in buying the goods. Buyers have private values for bundles of goods they are interested in buying. The seller’s objective is to allocate the goods to the buyers efficiently (maximizing the total utility of buyers). Since the values of buyers are private information, th...