This study examines the relationship between types of government and level of public spending. There are two competing perspectives about the consequences of coalition governments for the size of public expenditures. The most common argument is that government spending increases under coalition governments, compared with one-party governments. Another line of thought contends that coalition gov...

We investigate the uniqueness of stable coalition structures, when the value of a coalition to a member depends solely on the identity of the other members of the coalition. We give a complete characterization of collections of coalitions which ensure that there is a unique stable coalition structure at every preference profile when only admissible coalitions may form. An alternative characteri...

Matching mechanisms have been proposed to mitigate underprovision of public goods in voluntary contribution models. This paper investigates coalition formation under matching mechanisms with multiple players who have the same preference but different incomes. Given income heterogeneity within a certain range, there always exist small matching rates which make all members in the coalition better...

Agents endowed with power compete for a divisible resource by forming coalitions with other agents. The coalition with the greatest power wins the resource and divides it among its members. The agents’ power increases according to their share of the resource. We study two models of coalition formation where winning agents accumulate power and losing agents may participate in further coalition f...

Tarsal coalitions are relatively rare diagnoses affecting adolescent patients that typically present with progressive foot pain. Cuboid-navicular coalition, a type of tarsal coalition, is extremely rare with less than 10 reported cases to date. Most prevailing theories reported have described this specific type of coalition as asymptomatic except at specific moments of stress and exercise. The ...

The present paper studies a new potential function of a cooperative game with a coalition structure. When define a marginal contribution of each player, a notion of a coalition formation by Hart and Kurz (1983) is considered. Our potential is a real-valued function in contrast to Winter (1992)’s one which is vector-valued function whose dimension is the number of elements in the coalition struc...

We study the formation of a ruling coalition in political environments. Each individual is endowed with a level of political power. The ruling coalition consists of a subset of the individuals in the society and decides the distribution of resources. A ruling coalition needs to contain enough powerful members to win against any alternative coalition that may challenge it, and it needs to be sel...

This paper studies coalition formation under asymmetric information. An outside party o ers private payments in order to in uence the collective decision over an unpopular reform. The willingness to accept such payments is private information. The paper demonstrates that a supermajority coalition induces truth-telling and secures the implementation of the decision for a price close to the full ...

Objective: To assess the relationship between the implementation of a SAFE KIDS Coalition and pediatric unintentional injury rates. Setting: Shelby County, Tennessee. Design: Retrospective observational analysis. Patients: County residents nine years of age or younger presenting to the children’s medical center, its emergency department, or its outpatient clinics from 1990–97. Intervention: Imp...