I consider an alternating offer bargaining game which is played by a risk neutral buyer and seller, where the value of the good to be traded follows a Markov process. For these games the existence of a perfect equilibrium is proved and the set of equilibrium payoffs and strategies are characterised. The main results are: (a) If the buyer is less patient than the seller, then there will be delay...

On-line commercial transactions involve an inherent mistrust between participant parties since, sometimes, no previous relation exists between them. Such mistrust may be a deadlock point in a trade transaction where the buyer does not want to perform the payment until the seller sends the good and the seller does not want to do so until the buyer pays for the purchase. In this paper we present ...

Abstract
 In international trade, the seller who will send goods to other countries and buyer price of be bought want sure that party contract fulfill its debts properly. The letter credit is an institution aims provide this. A a made by person has purchased goods, upon submission certain documents determined seller, making with bank ensure payment debt. supervisor opens credit. beneficiar...

Innovation generation has increasingly been recognized as an outcome of interaction between a firm and various outside entities. According to this view, supplier involvement and alliances are routes to innovation generation. Despite this realization, there is a dearth of research, both conceptual and empirical, focusing on innovation generation in buyer-seller relationships in supply chains. In...

The Internet has made a wealth of new tools available to the industrial buyer. However, researchers have suggested that computer mediated interaction with suppliers may not be conducive to strong supplier relationships in general and to trust in particular. This paper compares two computer-mediated sourcing tools (email negotiation and Internet reverse auctions) with face-to-face negotiation. I...

We give a new approach in modeling the incomplete information in a buyer-seller game. We assume that the seller does not know the buyer's utility function at all. Usually the problem is solved by determining the Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the game, where it is assumed that the buyer's utility function has only some parameters unknown to the seller, and the seller knows the distribution of the...

We consider a simple bilateral trading game between a seller and a buyer who have private valuations for an indivisible good. The seller makes a price o¤er which the buyer can either accept or reject. If the seller can observe the valuation of the buyer (if information is symmetric), then the trading outcome is trivially e¢ cient. If the seller can not observe the valuation (if information is a...

We study a dynamic Bayesian persuasion framework in a finite horizon setting consisting of a Seller and a Buyer. The Seller wishes to persuade the Buyer to buy a durable good at a given price by providing information about its relevance (match quality). The Buyer has private information about his valuation for a good match and we study optimal dynamic information policies employed by the Seller...

This paper considers a standard buyer-seller relation where the seller can take noncontractible actions that raise the value of the good to the buyer. This relationship can either take place inside a firm so that the buyer can give orders to the seller or across firm boundaries. Both the buyer and the seller can, if they wish, become altruistic towards one another. Becoming altruistic is costly...

Our research proposes a simple game model that captures the incentives dictating the interaction between buyers and sellers and reveals the strategies that evolve in different scenarios, such as eBay auctions. In particular, we find seller history has a significant effect on player strategy. We prove that for simple reputation-based buyer strategies, a seller’s decision whether to cheat or not ...