Drawing from ideas of collusion in option games model with Cournot competition and price competition in a differentiated duopoly, we model, in a binomial framework, the latent collusion opportunity open to a first-follower. The first-follower is faced with investment decision in production capacity under market uncertainty as well as competitive uncertainty. The firstfollower has an opportunity...

Based on the actual data, this paper shows Chinese insurance market monopoly status through the Market Concentration Rate, and established the repeated price game model for three oligarchs with delayed decision according to Bertrand model. Discussed the two main goals of insurance companies faced in the game process: the expansion of profit and market share. Through the application of nonlinear...

We study oligopoly price competition between multiproduct firms, firms whose products interact in the profit function. Specifically, we focus on the impact of intra-firm product interactions on the level of equilibrium profits. This impact is divided into two effects: a direct effect and a strategic effect (i.e., through the competitors’ actions). We derive conditions such that the strategic ef...

Most existing Nash-Cournot models of competition among electricity generators assume that firms behave purely Cournot or Bertrand with respect to transmission decisions by the independent system operator. Such models are unrealistic for markets in which interfaces connecting subnetworks are frequently saturated but the congestion pattern within individual subnetworks is less predictable. We pro...

Cognitive Radio is gaining popularity and acceptance all over the world as an efficient way to utilise the limited wireless spectrum resources. Out of the many design requirements of Cognitive Radio such as spectrum sensing, spectrum allocation, power control etc., spectrum sharing is one of main challenges to ensure peaceful co-existence of the primary and secondary users. Since multiple users...

In a differentiated products setting with n varieties it is shown, under certain regularity conditions, that if the demand structure is symmetric and Bertrand and Cournot equilibria are unique then prices and profits are larger and quantities smaller in Cournot than in Bertrand competition and, as n grows, both equilibria converge to the efficient outcome at a rate of at least l/n. If Bertrand ...

Consider two manufacturers, each producing a single substitutable product. In any geographical area, there are two retail outlets through which the products are sold to the end consumers. Each of the two retail outlets could be privately owned (i.e. a franchised outlet) or owned by the manufacturer (i.e. a vertically integrated company store). Each manufacturer makes vertical integration decisi...

Standard repeated-interaction theories of oligopoly make collusion seem much easier than a \structural consensus" suggests that it is. I show that more intuitive results can emerge if colluders could renegotiate after a deviation. In repeated Bertrand oligopoly, if agreements are subject to a certain kind of frictionless renegotiation, then full collusion is impossible with more than three rms,...