The use of games and simulations as means of instruction is particularly appropriate to a behavioral process such as collective bargaining. The author describes, analyses and évaluâtes one which is used at the University of Washington.

This paper derives the Generalized Nash Bargaining Solution for two-player games where each player has the option of postponing bargaining till a future period. This option endogenously determines the threat points of the initial game. The outcome is compared with the case where there is no such option, and with the usual Rubinstein bargaining game where one offer per period is made. JEL Classi...

This paper examines pricing policies for OPEC under the assumption that the cartel is composed of a block of s/~e~t/~r countries with large cash needs and a t.lock of .yuI’ercountrics with little immediate need for cash and a loHcr rate of discount. The decision problem for the twopart cartel is embodied in a game-theoretic framework and the optimal bargaining solution is computed using results...

In most models of bargaining, costless and unverifiable lies about private information and incredible threats about future actions are considered cheap talk and do not impact outcomes. In practice, however, this type of talk is often an integral part of bargaining. This experiment examines the impact of cheap talk in an ultimatum bargaining setting with two-sided imperfect information. In contr...

By formulating negotiations about licensing payments as cooperative games without side payments, we investigate stable bargaining outcomes in licensing a cost-reducing technology of an external patent holder to oligopolistic firms producing a homogeneous product under two licensing policies: fee and royalty. The final bargaining outcome in fee licensing is uniquely determined, because the NTU b...

This paper takes up the foundational issue of existence of stationary subgame perfect equilibria in a general class of coalitional bargaining games that includes many known bargaining models and models of coalition formation. General sufficient conditions for existence of equilibria are currently lacking in many interesting environments: bargaining models with non-concave stage utility function...

A multicoalitional bargaining problem is a non-transferable utility game and for each coalition, a bargaining rule. We look for ordinally invariant solutions to such problems and discover a subrule of Bennett’s (1997, Games Econ. Behav. 19, 151–179) that satisfies the property. On a subclass of problems that is closely related to standard bargaining problems and allocation problems with majorit...

This paper argues that the notion of focal points is important in understanding bargaining processes. Recent literature confines a discussion of the usefulness of the notion to coordination problems and when bargaining experiments result in outcomes that are inconsistent with a straightforward interpretation of economic theory, some notion of ‘fairness’ is invoked. This paper uses symmetry requ...

Vehicle routing problem is one of the most important issues in transportation. Among VRP problems, the competitive VRP is more important because there is a tough competition between distributors and retailers. In this study we introduced new method for VRP in competitive environment. In these methods Two-Person Nonzero Sum games are defined to choose equilibrium solution. Therefore, revenue giv...