To overcome a market of ‘lemons’, online auction marketplaces must be able to differentiate among products and generate price premiums for high-quality ones. Still, the literature has only focused on seller quality uncertainty (seller reputation), alas ignoring the role of product quality uncertainty, which is defined as the degree by which the outcome of the transaction cannot be accurately pr...

Electronic government and electronic government, namely a change in the manual system of to an one, one example is Online auction (E-auction), which site procurement goods based on electronics/online through applications or websites can be used for executable auctions, non-auction mandatory execution, as well voluntary non-execution auctions. In addition, they bid online via internet their cell...

This work studies the English auction protocol, which comprises three interactive parties—the Registration Manager, the Auction Manager and the Bidder. The registration manager confirms and authenticates the identities of bidders; the auction manager issues the bidding rights and maintains order in holding the auction. The proposed scheme provides the following security features—anonymity, trac...

A second-price sealed-bid auction is that a bidder who o ers the highest price gets a good in the second highest price. This style of auction solves the problems of both an English auction and a rst-price sealed-bid auction. An electronic rst-price sealed-bid auction cannot directly be applied to a second-price sealed-bid auction which keeps the highest bid secret. We propose the veri able disc...

We study the benchmark independent private value auction setting when bidders have endogenously determined budgets. Before bidding, a bidder decides how much money she will borrow. Bidders incur a cost to borrowing. We show that bidders are indifferent between participating in a first-price, second-price and all-pay auction. The all-pay auction gives higher revenue than the first-price auction,...

This paper reports the results of over 130 auctions conducted under controlled conditions to examine the robustness of several auction mechanisms to allocate multiple objects. The simultaneous discrete auction process used by the Federal Communications Commission to allocate Personal Communications licenses was contrasted with a sequential auction and a combinatorial auction over a variety of d...

We study the design of truthful auction mechanisms for maximizing the seller’s profit. We focus on the case when the auction mechanism does not have any knowledge of bidders’ valuations, especially of their upper bound. For the Single-Item auction, we obtain an “asymptotically” optimal scheme: for any k ∈ Z and ǫ > 0, we give a randomized truthful auction that guarantees an expected profit of Ω...