We compare multi-object English-type ascending price auctions with first price sealed bid auctions in private values environments with multi-object demands. Special attention is paid to the effect of closing rules on ascending auctions’ outcomes. JEL classification code: C92, D44

We investigate the connection between equilibrium existence and its attainability through simple market mechanisms in exchange economies with indivisibilities and complementarities. The analysis suggests that attaining efficient outcomes through simple non-combinatorial auctions may be problematic even when market clearing prices exist. JEL classification code: C62, D44, D51

We argue that with interdependent utility functions growth can lead to a decline in total welfare of a society if the gains from growth are sufficiently unequally distributed in the presence of negative externalities, i.e., envy. JEL Code: D62, D63, D64, O00.

If unions appropriate quasi-rents from relation-specific capital, observed factor prices no longer reflect effective costs. Unionism has effects akin to a partial factor tax on capital. Demand curve settlements need not imply higher K/L among union firms. JEL code: J51 (Trade Unions: Objectives, Structure, and Effects) *Helpful suggestions were received from John Chilton, Eric Maskin, and Joe S...

We examine the board of directors’ problem of determining when to terminate a CEO. The optimal policy takes a simple form – the CEO is fired if profits fall below a critical value. The analysis yields the optimal probability of CEO turnover. JEL Code: G34

In this note we consider the treatment of structural breaks in VAR models used to test for unit roots and cointegration. We give practical guidelines for the inclusion and the specification of intervention dummies in those models. JEL Classification Code: C32, C52, E43.

Competitive equilibria are shown to exist in two-object exchange economies with indivisibilities and additive complementarities in agent valuations between objects, provided that complementarities are common across agents. We further investigate whether the competitive equilibrium can be obtained as an outcome of a simultaneous English-type auction mechanism under non-strategic (honest) bidding...

We examine the role low-price guarantees allegedly play in supporting supracompetitive prices. We find that when firms can commit to matching or beating any lower price announced by a competitor, all Nash equilibria yield Bertrand selling prices. This result casts doubt on the robustness of the conclusions of models which restrict attention to meet-the-competition clauses only. JEL Classificati...