We study the Diamond-Dybvig [3] model as developed in Green and Lin [5] and Peck and Shell [7]. We dispense with the notion of a bank as a coalition of depositors. Instead, our bank is a self-interested agent with a technological advantage in recordkeeping. We examine the implications of the resulting agency problem for the design of bank contracts and the possibility of bank-run equilibria. Fo...

Using banks’ internal models for regulatory purposes, while aimed at making capital requirements more accurate, invites regulatory arbitrage. I develop a framework to study the strategic selection of risk models, and derive predictions in line with recent empirical evidence. I also study optimal regulations. Penalizing banks with low risk-weights when they suffer abnormal losses is a powerful t...

The paper, motivated by the extent of government involvement in the financial sectors of many countries, presents a model of a link between financial intermediation and economic growth. The model conceptualises a financial leverage coefficient, a construct which is the outcome of aggravated moral hazard generated by a combination of government involvement in financial intermediation and the pre...

There is long-standing theoretical debate on the role of collateral in …nancial markets. There is no satisfactory evidence of the causal relationship (if any) between the amount of collateral required and the subsequent probability of overdues. We analyze an exogenous change in the number of cosigners required as collateral on small loans in South India. Our regression discontinuity approach re...

We study banking with ex ante moral hazard. Resolving the mis-alignment of the incentives between banks and depositors requires early liquidation with positive probability: e¢cient risk-sharing between depositors is no longer implementable. In a closed region with a single bank, we show that (i) with costless and perfect monitoring, contracts with bank runs o¤ the equilibrium path of play impro...

Con…rmation bias refers to cognitive errors that bias one towards one’s own prior beliefs. A vast empirical literature documents its existence and psychologists identify it as one of the most problematic aspects of human reasoning. In this paper, we present three related scenarios where rational behaviour leads to outcomes that are observationally equivalent to di¤erent types of conformation bi...

Con…rmation bias refers to cognitive errors that bias one towards one’s own prior beliefs. A vast empirical literature documents its existence and psychologists identify it as one of the most problematic aspects of human reasoning. In this paper, we present three related scenarios where rational behaviour leads to outcomes that are observationally equivalent to di¤erent types of conformation bi...

Two soybean breeding lines (D82-2397A and J82-190) resistant to Heterodera glycines race 5 produced higher yields (P = 0.05) than the race 4-resistant cultivar Bedford for 2 years when planted in a field infested with H. glycines race 5 at Tiptonville, Tennessee. Yields were not different between D82-2397A and Bedford when planted in fields infested with race 3, race 9, or with no cyst nematode...