This paper proposes a game-theoretic approach to address the problem of optimal sensor placement for detecting cyber-attacks in networked control systems. The is formulated as zero-sum game with two players, namely malicious adversary and detector. Given protected target vertex, detector places at single vertex monitor system detect presence adversary. On other hand, selects through which condu...

In this paper, we investigate a non-zero-sum stochastic differential reinsurance-investment game problem between two insurers. Both insurers can purchase proportional reinsurance and invest in financial market that contains risk-free asset risky asset. We consider the insurers' wealth processes with delay to characterize bounded memory feature. For considering effec...

International trade has improved living standards but also become a major channel for spreading shocks on global scale. The increasing relevance of intersectoral linkages and in intermediates renewed interest input–output techniques. This paper enriches the literature empirical models with an input–output/econometric approach including substitution effects price spillovers. Our model shows that...

Dynamic zero-sum games are an important class of problems with applications ranging from evasion-pursuit and heads-up poker to certain adversarial versions of control problems such as multi-armed bandit and multiclass queuing problems. These games are generally very difficult to solve even when one player’s strategy is fixed, and so constructing and evaluating good sub-optimal policies for each...

We consider $2$-colourings $f : E(G) \rightarrow \{ -1 ,1 \}$ of the edges a graph $G$ with colours $-1$ and $1$ in $\mathbb{Z}$. A subgraph $H$ is said to be zero-sum under $f$ if $f(H) := \sum_{e\in E(H)} f(e) =0$. study following type questions, several cases obtaining best possible results: Under which conditions on $|f(G)|$ can we guarantee existence spanning tree $G$? The types are comple...

This paper is a continuation of our papers [61 and [71 and is concerned with a continuous time Markov game in which the state space is countable and the action spaces of player I and player n are compact metric spaces. In the game, the players continuously observe the state of the system and then choose actions. As a result, the reward is paid to player I from player n and the system moves to a...

We examine experimentally how humans behave when they, unbeknownst to them, play against a computer which implements its part of a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium. We consider two games, one zero-sum and another unprofitable with a pure minimax strategy. A minority of subjects’ play was consistent with their Nash equilibrium strategy. But a larger percentage of subjects’ play was more consisten...

In order to design robust networks, first, one has to be able to measure robustness of network topologies. In [1], a game-theoretic model, the network blocking game, was proposed for this purpose, where a network operator and an attacker interact in a zero-sum game played on a network topology, and the value of the equilibrium payoff in this game is interpreted as a measure of robustness of tha...

One of the most critical problems facing governments at present is terrorism. Most recent studies are striving to find an optimal solution this problem that threatens security and stability people. To combat terrorism, government uses various means, such as improving education quality, providing labor opportunities, seeking social justice, creating religious awareness, building arrangements. Th...