This paper studies equilibrium selection in supermodular games based on perfect foresight dynamics. A normal form game is played repeatedly in a large society of rational agents. There are frictions: opportunities to revise actions follow independent Poisson processes. Each agent forms his belief about the future evolution of the action distribution in the society, and takes an action that maxi...

Several supermodular losses have been shown to improve the perceptual quality of image segmentation in a discriminative framework such as a structured output support vector machine (SVM). These loss functions do not necessarily have the same structure as the one used by the segmentation inference algorithm, and in general, we may have to resort to generic submodular minimization algorithms for ...

We provide a counterexample to the performance guarantee obtained in paper “Il’ev, V., Linker, N., 2006. Performance guarantees of greedy algorithm for minimizing supermodular set function on comatroid”, which was published Volume 171 European Journal Operational Research. point out where this error originates from proof main theorem.

We consider the problem of approximate Bayesian inference in log-supermodular models. These models encompass regular pairwise MRFs with binary variables, but allow to capture highorder interactions, which are intractable for existing approximate inference techniques such as belief propagation, mean field, and variants. We show that a recently proposed variational approach to inference in log-su...

We introduce a class of discrete point processes that we call the Submodular Point Processes (SPPs). These processes are characterized via a submodular (or supermodular) function, and naturally model notions of information, coverage and diversity, as well as cooperation. Unlike Log-submodular and Log-supermodular distributions (Log-SPPs) such as determinantal point processes (DPPs), SPPs are th...

Cooperative games offer an elegant framework to model cooperation among self-interested agents. A central question of these games is how to distribute the payoff to each player when all players cooperate and derive some benefits. In this work, we consider cooperative transferable utility games where a subset of players can form a coalition if and only if they are connected in the underlying com...