For many years the Simultaneous Multi-Round Auction (SMRA) has been the primary auction design for spectrum sales worldwide. Recently, the core-selecting Combinatorial Clock Auction (CCA) has been used as an alternative to the SMRA in a number of countries promising strong incentives for truthful bidding and high efficiency as a result. We analyze the efficiency and auctioneer revenue of the CC...

The Federal Communications Commission’s (FCC’s) ongoing Incentive Auction will, if successful, transfer billions of dollars of radio spectrum from television broadcasters to mobile-network operators. Hundreds of broadcasters may go off the air. Most of those remaining on the air, including hundreds of Canadian broadcasters not bidding, will have to move to new channels to continue broadcasting....

Dynamic spectrum auction is an effective solution to manage spectrum across many small networks. Yet without proper economic design, spectrum auctions can be easily manipulated by bidders, suffering huge efficiency loss. Selfish bidders can manipulate their bids, individually or in groups, to game the system and obtain outcomes that favor their own interests and hurt others. Prior solutions hav...

The Internet of Things (IoT) is a vision of the upcoming society. It can provide pervasive communication between two or more entities using 4G-LTE (Long Term Evolution) communication technology. In 4G-LTE networks, there are two important problems: helping manage the spectrum demands of IoT devices and achieving much more revenue with the limited resource. This paper proposes a pricing framewor...

We provide an ascending auction that yields an e¢ cient outcome when there are many identical units for sale and bidders have interdependent values and downward-sloping demand. Our ascending auction both extends and generalizes Ausubel’s (1997) and yields the same outcome as Perry and Reny’s (2002) generalization of Vickrey’s (1961) sealed-bid auction. There are two key features of our auction....