Sports leagues constitute one of the few examples of legally operating cartels. In this paper I examine how gate revenue sharing may serve to coordinate talent investments within these cartels. I show that sharing revenues has the potential to raise cartel profits, because it decreases the incentive to invest in playing talent. Leagues consisting of teams with heterogeneous local markets should...

F iscal regime is one of the main differences between petroleum contracts. Fiscal regimes in oil contracts are divided to two main categories namely Concessionary and Contractual Systems. In contractual systems, the main difference between service and production sharing contracts is the way of compensation of contractor services which could be in cash or in kind. In production sharin...

In a two-stage supply chain composed of a supplier and a retailer, the supply chain models under a fuzzy environment are researched. The parameters of market demand function, the costs of the supplier and retailer are treated as trapezoidal fuzzy numbers. The decision processes are analyzed under the decentralized and centralized decision, and the decision model with revenue sharing contract is...

This paper discusses the influence of time inconsistency problem on technology-leading firms' choice between in-house production and technology transfer. Because of incredibility of innovator's commitment of not exporting after licensing, she may not be able to extract rent from licensing as much as when she could commit credibly. Facing this distortion, she chooses in-house production when the...

This paper presents a simulation-based decision model for contract period determination in Energy Performance Contracting (EPC). The model attempts to assist the Energy Service Companies (ESCOs) on how long the contract period should be to balance the bidding competitiveness and the potential revenue loss. The uncertainties within the energy efficiency investment and the energy cost savings as ...

A principal requires a manager for production. He can use an internal manager, or contracts with an external manger. In each case, the manager obtains experience benefits from production. When the principal uses an internal manager, both parties share cost information. When the principal contracts with an external manager, only the external manager acquires cost information. The internal manage...