We consider the static and dynamic models of Cournot duopoly with tax evasion. In the dynamic model we introduce the time delay and we analyze the local stability of the stationary state. There is a critical value of the delay when the Hopf bifurcation occurs. Mathematics Subject Classification: 34K18, 47N10; Jel Classification: C61, C62, H26

The Examining Neighbourhood Activities in Built Living Environments in London (ENABLE London) study provides a unique opportunity to examine differences in mental health and well-being amongst adults seeking social, intermediate (affordable rent), and market-rent housing in a purpose built neighbourhood (East Village, the former London 2012 Olympic Athletes' Village), specifically designed to e...

Since 1980, US corporate valuations have risen relative to assets and operating margins have grown. The possibility of sustained economic rents has raised concerns about economic dynamism and inequality. But rising profits could represent growing returns to corporate investments in intangibles instead of returns to political rent seeking. Using new data on Federal regulation and data on lobbyin...

The idea that cooperation can be a source of power has been extensively discussed in various disciplines. We study this idea from an economic viewpoint by analyzing the effect of intragroup cooperation in a static group rent-seeking model. Intragroup cooperation means that agents’ rent-seeking efforts maximize their group’s expected payoff. Although intragroup cooperation always reduces average...

This review attempts to identify treatments of corruption that draw upon characteristics of underdevelopment either as causes or as consequences. It focuses on three aspects of corruption in developing economies: red tape, rent-seeking, and the abundance of intermediaries. Red tape is presented as arising from differences in abilityto-pay and willingness-to-pay, which is a consequence of incomp...

A key challenge in the literature has been to provide an explanation for the fact that observed reorganizations seem to be substantially more drastic and numerous than implied by changes in environmental conditions. This paper offers an explanation based on the observation that contracts are necessarily incomplete, and therefore there exists a multitude of everyday circumstances in which opport...

This study demarcates costinefficiency in Chinese banks into X-inefficiency and rent-seekinginefficiency. A protected banking market not only encourages weak management and X-inefficiency but also public ownership and state directed lending encourages moral hazard and bureaucratic rent seeking. This paper uses bootstrap non-parametric techniques to estimate measures of X-inefficiency and rent-s...

We describe recent advances in the study of rent seeking and corruption in financial markets. We outline three areas of inquiry: (a) conceptualizing rent seeking, (b) identifying rent-provision channels and their general equilibrium impact, and (c) designing feasible remedial mechanisms. We provide suggestions for making further progress in these areas and review a variety of approaches taken i...

This paper investigates a model where a manager gathers private information about the cost variables of his responsibility center. The owner then elicits the manager's information from a budgeting mechanism. If the manager has to acquire information before the budgeting stage, stronger production distortions relative to the standard adverse-selection situation arise. Moreover, the manager may e...

In an experiment on sequential rent seeking, we find that the theoretically predicted first-mover advantage does not exist empirically. Rather, a second-mover advantage can be observed. Though the subgame perfect equilibrium can not prevail in experiment, individual behavior is highly reasonable nevertheless, such that subjects appear to play a reduced form of the original game. We also observe...