Imagine a zombie world that looks “from the outside” just like ours, but where there is no phenomenal consciousness. Creatures look us move about as we do and make same noises do, nobody experiences or feels anything. How much of epistemic value that's exemplified in our survives one? The short answer is: any kind requires occurrence consciousness for its exemplification cannot exist world, doe...

Abstract The cognitive phenomenology debate centers on two questions. (1) What is an apt characterization of the conscious thought? And (2), what role does this play? I argue that answers to former question bear significantly latter question. In particular, show conservatism about not compatible with view explains constitution thought. proceed as follows: To begin with, analyze our sensory expe...

Philosophers traditionally recognize two main features of mental states: intentionality and phenomenal consciousness. To a first approximation, intentionality is the aboutness of mental states, and phenomenal consciousness is the felt, experiential, qualitative, or “what it’s like” (Nagel 1974) aspect of mental states. In the past few decades, these features have been widely assumed to be disti...

Thomas Metzinger argues that phenomenal selves are appearances produced by the ongoing operations of a “self-model” that simulates, emulates, and represents aspects of the system’s states to itself – and not substantial things. In this essay, I explain the nature of phenomenal selfhood and then describe the most important problem that arises in connection with explaining phenomenal selfhood. I ...