The problem of dividing resources fairly occurs in many practical situations and is therefore an important topic of study in economics. In this paper, we investigate envy-free divisions in the setting where there are multiple players in each interested party. While all players in a party share the same set of resources, each player has her own preferences. Under additive valuations drawn random...

In this work we give a tight lower bound on makespan approximations for envy-free allocation mechanism dedicated to scheduling tasks on unrelated machines. Specifically, we show that no mechanism exists that can guarantee an envy-free allocation of jobs to m machines with a makespan of less than a factor of O(logm) of the minimal makespan. Combined with previous results, this paper definitively...

The behaviour of subjects in ultimatum bargaining experiments is very different from that predicted by standard theory. These ‘anomalies’ are frequently explained by fairness considerations. In this paper we consider the possibility that the subjects are simply envious. We derive the implications of envy for the behaviour in ultimatum games and it will be shown that envy is a potential explanat...

The paper argues that values are universals, either properties or relations. For the latter, instantiation is a matter of the content of the relation, the relata, and the context (the instantiation of further relations). This moderate realist conception helps us solve some notorious problems in axiology, i.e. malicious pleasure, compassion, envy, and perverted love. Another other important impl...

We introduce an evolutionary game in which envy and charity can be considered as a consequence of Darwinian competition, i.e. individuals aim at increasing their own proportion rather than their absolute contribution to the next generation, and other-regarding-preference is a "method" for that. If the damage is additive and its cost is low, an envious strategy defeats a neutral strategy (ration...

In this paper we study the strategic aspects of the No-Envy solution for the problem of allocating a …nite set of indivisible goods among a group of agents when monetary compensations are possible. In the …rst part of the paper we consider the case where each agent receives, at most, one indivisible good. We prove that the set of equilibrium allocations of any direct revelation game associated ...

We study the problem of identifying prices to support a given allocation of items to bidders in an envy-free way. A bidder will envy another bidder if she would prefer to obtain the other bidder’s item at the price paid by that bidder. Envy-free prices for allocations have been studied extensively; here, we focus on the impact of budgets: beyond their willingness to pay for items, bidders are a...

We study a generalization of the well known house allocation problem in which agents may own fractions of different houses summing to an arbitrary quantity, but have use for only the equivalent of one unit of a house. We also depart from the classical model by assuming that arbitrary quantities of each house may be available to the market. Justified envy considerations arise when two agents hav...

What is a fair way to assign rooms to several housemates, and divide the rent between them? This is not just a theoretical question: many people have used the Spliddit website to obtain envy-free solutions to rent division instances. But envy freeness, in and of itself, is insufficient to guarantee outcomes that people view as intuitive and acceptable. We therefore focus on solutions that optim...

We develop a procedure for implementing an efficient and envy-free allocation of m objects among n individuals with the possibility of monetary side-payments. The procedure eliminates envy by compensating envious players. It is fully descriptive and says explicitly which compensations should be made, and in what order. Moreover, it is simple enough to be carried out without computer support. We...