Mary is confined to a black-and-white room, is educated through black-and-white books and through lectures relayed on black-and white television. In this way she learns everything there is to know about the physical nature of the world. She knows all the physical facts about us and our environment, in a wide sense of 'physical' which includes everything in completed physics, chemistry, and neur...

There are various ways in which science can be classified as theistic or religion-based. One is when the components of scientific theories are accepted by the followers of religions and rejected by the opponents of religious beliefs. Although Quine (1908-2000) does not believe in any religion, the possibility of one concept of religious science can be inferred from his explanation of the founda...

We should not accept standard anti-emergentist arguments that rest on assuming the correctness of physicalism. Standard strategies that are intended to block the possibility of emergent properties come at a high cost. This paper argues that they rule out a range of ways that the world could be that are, at least prima facie, scientifically acceptable prior to scientific inquiry. The paper is in...

Suppose $G$ is a split connected‎ ‎reductive orthogonal or symplectic group over an infinite field‎ ‎$F,$ $P=MN$ is a maximal parabolic subgroup of $G,$ $frak{n}$ is‎ ‎the Lie algebra of the unipotent radical $N.$ Under the adjoint‎ ‎action of its stabilizer in $M,$ every maximal prehomogeneous‎ ‎subspaces of $frak{n}$ is determined‎.

I argue for an idealist ontology consistent with empirical observations, which seeks to explain the facts of nature more parsimoniously than physicalism and bottom-up panpsychism. This ontology also attempts to offer more explanatory power than both physicalism and bottom-up panpsychism, in that it does not fall prey to either the ‘hard problem of consciousness’ or the ‘subject combination prob...

An adequate ontology of color must face the empirical facts about perceptual variation. In this paper I begin by reviewing a range of data about perceptual variation, and showing how they tell against color physicalism and motivate color relationalism. Next I consider a series of objections to the argument from perceptual variation, and argue that they are unpersuasive. My conclusion will be th...

In chapter 2 Swinburne rejects physicalism for two reason. The first is that it committed to entailments do not exist. It suggested this reason questionable both because there no persuasive deny are such entailments, and also think has entailments. second the mental involves privileged access by subject physical features allow access. proposed does in fact permit 3 defends Simple View of person...

In previous work (Wilson forthcoming), I have endorsed an account of the physical according to which an entity is physical just in case it is (approximately accurately) treated by current or future (in the limit of inquiry, ideal) physics, and is not fundamentally mental. Call this account of the physical the physics-based NFM (“no fundamental mentality”) account. The physics-based NFM account ...

A Thomistic metaphysics of participation in being offers an account rationality that is more complete and coherent than nonreductive physicalism. It a reasoned understanding how embodied intellectual subject shares life. This metaphysical framework supports as participated power, essential property human nature empowering persons to know reality make choices accordingly. Human fulfilment truth ...