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This paper experimentally tests the impact of managerial incentives on competitive (market) outcomes. We use a Cournot duopoly game to show that when managers’ incentives are based on the firm’s absolute performance (profits), collusion can be sustained. However, when managers’ incentives are based on the firm’s relative performance (their profits relative to the other firm’s profits), this dri...

This paper examines the impact of repeated renegotiation on incentives and managerial tenure when performance information is serially correlated. In addition to providing a general solution to a multi-period agency problem with serially correlated performance measures, the paper characterizes optimal managerial tenure/turnover policies as a function of the time-series properties of performance ...

Using data on 2941 practicing managerial accountants, we explore rank-based di€erences in measured ability, and technical, industry, and tacit managerial knowledge. Our data indicate that concomitant with increases in rank are: (1) decreasing levels of, and increasing variability in, measured entry-level technical knowledge, (2) increasing measured levels of, and generally decreasing variabilit...

What are the forces that influence strategic managerial decisions in the context of economic transition? In this paper, we analyse how strategic and governance forces influence the degree of discretion perceived by managers operating in the context of the transition economy of Russia. An exploratory case study provides insights about the managerial decision-making process in a transition econom...

Micro level studies suggest managerial skills play a key role in the adoption of modern technologies. In this paper we model the interactive process between on-the-job managerial skill acquisition and the adoption of modern technology. We use the model to illustrate why some countries develop managerial skills quickly and adopt best practice technologies, while others stay backwards. The model ...

We test for information structure in executive compensation. The optimal compensation contract in the principal agent model implies that incentives increase with the level of managerial talent only if information about managerial talent is asymmetric in that executives have better information than shareholders. We find positive relations between the payperformance sensitivity and the level of m...

We present evidence that managerial shareholdings are an important determinant of bank risk-taking. Managerial shareholdings are positively related to total and ®rm speci®c risk in the late 1980s when banking was relatively less regulated and when the industry was under considerable ®nancial stress. However, following legislation in 1989 and 1991 designed to reduce risk-taking and also re ̄ectin...

An efficient managerial labor market should compensate executives according to their contribution to shareholder value. We provide novel empirical evidence about the relationship between executive pay and managerial contribution to value by exploiting the exogenous variation resulting from stock price reactions to sudden deaths. We find, first, that the managerial labor market is characterized ...

With the purpose to enable reflections concerning nurses' managerial performance in hospitalization units, three studies conducted in three different decades, in the same university hospital, were analyzed. From this analysis, it was observed that nurses' managerial practice has been mainly characterized by the accentuated compliance to pre-established norms, thus showing a reiterative praxis. ...