In a dynamic setting with demand following a random process, we ask how investment and operating decisions can be delegated to a manager with unknown time preferences. Only the manager observes the demand realization in each period and, therefore, has private information when choosing whether to acquire the productive asset and, subsequently, how to utilize it. We derive accrual accounting-base...

Abstract. We model costly interactions (contracts) between managers and investors. We suggest that globalization of production and favorable technology shock of the 1990s altered economic environment of managerinvestor interactions. These changes exacerbate agency conflict due to the increased managerial gains from ex post reneging, and, simultaneously, decreased costs of managerial reneging. I...

We introduce ctm, a process calculus which embodies a notion of trust for global computing systems. In ctm each principal (location) is equipped with a policy, which determines its legal behaviour, and with a protocol, which allows interactions between principals and the flow of information from principals to policies. We elect to formalise policies using a Datalog-like logic, and to express pr...

Is firm behavior mainly driven by its environment or rather by the characteristics of its managers? We develop a cognitive theory of manager fixed effects, where the allocation of managerial attention determines firm behavior. We show that in complex environments, the endogenous allocation of attention exacerbates manager fixed effects. Small differences in managerial expertise then may result ...

Theoretical and empirical efforts focusing on the interplay between work context and managerial role requirements have been conspicuously absent in the scholarly literature. This paucity exists despite over 60 years of research concerning the requirements of managerial work and with the rather universal recognition that work context meaningfully shapes organizational behavior. The authors devel...