Scholars have long recognized two classes of special interest group (SIG) expenditures: inside lobbying, which is intended to influence the content a bill; and outside likelihood bill enacted into law. This paper juxtaposes both lobbying activities within single model. Policy choices are function decision-maker's assessment SIGs' willingness engage in lobbying. Importantly, expenditures do not ...

In recent years accounting researchers have identified “political” lobbying as a problem for accounting standard setting. This paper presents a simple game-theoretic analysis of the political process to identify situations where companies have incentives to lobby the political principal instead of participating in the usual due process of accounting standard setting. Analysis of the model sugge...

Article history: Received 18 April 2005 Received in revised form 20 March 2008 Accepted 7 May 2008 Available online 24 May 2008 Which government functions should be decentralized (resp. centralized) once lobbying behavior is taken into account?We find that the answer largely depends on how the interests of the regional lobbies are positioned with respect to the function to be decentralized (res...

This paper investigates the effect of domestic politics on international environmental policy by incorporating into a classic model of coalition formation the phenomenon of lobbying by national special-interest groups. In doing so, it contributes to the theory of international environmental agreements, which has overwhelmingly assumed that governments make choices based on benefits and costs th...

We propose various models for lobbying in a probabilistic environment, in which an actor (called “The Lobby”) seeks to influence the voters’ preferences of voting for or against multiple issues when the voters’ preferences are represented in terms of probabilities. In particular, we provide two evaluation criteria and three bribery methods to formally describe these models, and we consider the ...

In this paper, we analyze the equilibrium of a sequential game-theoretical model of lobbying, due to Groseclose and Snyder (1996), describing a legislature that vote over two alternatives, where two opposing lobbies, Lobby 0 and Lobby 1, compete by bidding for legislators’ votes. In this model, the lobbyist moving first suffers from a second mover advantage and will make an offer to a panel of ...

Lobbying and Regulation in a Political Economy: Evidence from the US Cellular Industry