Are minorities more vulnerable to opportunism? We find that individuals from a minority group face greater danger of being cheated by an opportunistic firm because trade with the group is less frequent and the value of a reputation for fairness toward the group is correspondingly smaller. If the majority is sufficiently large it can only lose from a solidarity strategy of punishing opportunism ...

All quasivalues rest on a set of three basic axioms (efficiency, null player, and additivity), which are augmented with positivity for random order values, and with positivity and partnership for weighted values. We introduce the concept of Möbius value associated with a sharing system and show that this value is characterized by the above three axioms. We then establish that (i) a Möbius value...

we study the effect of education and its expenditures, especially in higher education, on poverty and income inequality. using the keynesian approach it is shown that education, from the theoretical point of view, lowers poverty and income inequality level. in an empirical work we, used the data including 111 observations from 91 countries, with different human development levels, and concluded...

In this paper, “innovative intelligence–biased technological change” (IIBTC) is examined as an alternative to the traditional concept of skill-biased technological change (SBTC) as a source of increases in wage inequality. The innovative intelligence of ordinary or average workers is an important element in productivity and can be heterogeneous across workers. Because technologies are heterogen...

Subjective Well-Being and Relative Deprivation: An Empirical Link This paper explores the relationship between two well-established concepts of measuring individual well-being: the concept of happiness, i.e. self-reported level of satisfaction with income and life, and relative deprivation/satisfaction, i.e. the gaps between the individual's income and the incomes of all individuals richer/poor...

In this work we deal with rationing problems. In particular with claims problems with indivisible goods, that is, problems in which a certain amount of indivisible units (of an homogeneous good), has to be distributed among a group of agents, when this amount is not enough to satisfy agents' demands. We define discrete rules to solve those problems that involve notions of fairness similar to th...

Wecharacterize the familyofnon-contestablebudget-monotone rules for the allocation of objects and money as those obtained by maximizing a min social welfare function among all non-contestable allocations. We provide three additional seemingly independent approaches to construct these rules. We present three applications of this characterization. First, we show that one can “rectify” any non-con...

To encourage diversity, branches may vary contracts’ priorities across slots. The agents who match to branches, however, have preferences only over match partners and contractual terms. Ad hoc approaches to resolving agents’ indifferences across slots in the Chicago and Boston school choice programs have introduced biases, which can be corrected with more careful market design. Slot-specific pr...

Equity and Efficiency in Multi-Worker Firms: Insights from Experimental Economics In this paper, we discuss recent evidence from economic experiments that study the impact of social preferences on workplace behavior. We focus on situations in which a single employer interacts with multiple employees. Traditionally, equity and efficiency have been seen as opposing aims in such work environments:...

This paper proposes a simpler interpretation of Harsanyi’s impartial observer idea. It postulates an impartiality axiom with respect to the distributions of a certain “benchmark good”. The axiom requires society to be indifferent between each distribution of the good and an equiprobable lottery among all distributions that differ from it only in the matching between individuals and allocations ...