The growing number of corporate scandals globally highlights the importance effective governance mechanisms. Many frameworks that are rooted in agency theory advocate election independent non-executive directors, an chairperson, and a lead director. Shareholder voting on or re-election directors (hereafter referred to as ‘director re-elections’) has been largely unexplored South Africa—a countr...

The paper examines the moderating role of board size between characteristics and bank’s performance. study collected data from 18 licensed banks in Ghana 2012 to 2020, giving 180 observations for this study. adopted System Generalized Method Moments assess causal relationship bank's performance Ghana. was control problems endogeneity unobserved heterogeneity issues. findings show a significant ...

The dominating perspective grounded in agency theory predicts that independent boards are more effective monitoring and thereby reducing earnings management, yet the extant empirical evidence is inconclusive. We nuance relationship between board independence management by introducing two additional theories explain directors’ role on board: of personal dependence praxis theory. According to the...

This study explores the effect of board directors’ characteristics on real earnings management in Jordanian non-financial companies listed Amman Stock Exchange. The sample size is 131 during period 2015–2017. uses a size, members’ independence, financial experience, number meetings, membership more than one board, and ownership members company shares to represent characteristics. Real measured ...

This study investigates the role of corporate governance regulations on financial performance within listed companies in Saudi Arabia. 120 organisations were selected from Stock Exchange, Tadawul, over a period four years between 2016 to 2019 for 565 observations. The data gathered about intendent variable board independence, size, meeting, interlocking, addition firm size and leverage as moder...

this study attempts to investigate the impacts of severalcorporate governance mechanisms on two alternative proxies for agencycosts, namely the ratio of total sales to total assets (asset turnover) and theratio of selling, general and administrative expenses to total sales(sg&a;). agency costs, non-executive directors on the board, andinstitutional investors are dependent variables. the analysi...

This paper analyzes board independence and competence as distinct, but inextricably linked aspects of board effectiveness. Competent directors add shareholder value because they have better information about the quality of projects. While a CEO cares about shareholder value, he also wants his board to behave loyally to him by agreeing to projects that give him private benefits. Because many asp...