We consider implementation problems under incomplete information without incentive compatibility. If the social choice functions do not satisfy incentive compatibility, full implementation is unattainable via the existing approaches. By focusing on the actual problems from Typhoon by Joseph Conrad and The Traveler’s Dilemma by Kaushik Basu (1994, 2007), we provide a new approach to such impleme...

Combinatorial optimization problems in the real world are ubiquitous. Practical applications include planning, scheduling, distributed control, resource allocation, etc. These problems often involve multiple agents and can be formulated as a Multiagent Constraint Optimization Problem (MCOP). A major challenge in such systems is the agent coordination, such that a global optimal outcome is achie...

Auctions in which agents’ payoffs are random variables have received increased attention in recent years. In particular, recent work in algorithmic mechanism design has produced mechanisms employing internal randomization, partly in response to limitations on deterministic mechanisms imposed by computational complexity. For many of these mechanisms, which are often referred to as truthful-in-ex...

Prediction markets are designed to elicit information from multiple agents in order to predict (obtain probabilities for) future events. A good prediction market incentivizes agents to reveal their information truthfully; such incentive compatibility considerations are commonly studied in mechanism design. While this relation between prediction markets and mechanism design is well understood at...

A social choice function is robustly implementable if there is a mechanism under which the process of iteratively eliminating strictly dominated messages lead to outcomes that agree with the social choice function for all beliefs at every type profile. In an interdependent-value environment with single-crossing preferences, we identify a contraction property on the preferences which together wi...

First, we summarize definitions and related theorems of asymptotic statistics in Section A. We prove Theorems in Section B. Lastly, Section C contains additional simulation results. A Asymptotic Statistics We summarize some results of asymptotic statistics from (Serfling, 1980). Let X1, X2, . . . and X be random variables on a probability space (Ω,A, P ). We say that Xn converges in probability...

We present the design and analysis of an approximately incentive-compatible combinatorial auction. In just a single run, the auction is able to extract enough value information from bidders to compute approximate truth-inducing payments. This stands in contrast to current auction designs that need to repeat the allocation computation as many times as there are bidders to achieve incentive compa...

In this paper we introduce a game-theoretic model for reward functions within a single Bitcoin mining pool. Our model consists only of an unordered history of reported shares and gives participating miners the strategy choices of either reporting or delaying when they discover a share or full solution. We defined a precise condition for incentive compatibility to ensure miners strategy choices ...

Demonstrating the incentive compatibility of an auction mechanism is always a hard but essential work in auction mechanism design. In this paper we discuss three different approaches to proof or check such property in regard of a multi-attribute auction mechanism: by analyzing well-known sufficient conditions, by mathematical analyzing the rules that govern the mechanism, and by empirically che...

This paper revisits Myerson and Satterthwaite's (1983) classic analysis of mechanism design for bilateral trading, replacing equilibrium with a level-k model strategic thinking focusing on direct mechanisms. The revelation principle fails models, so restricting attention to mechanisms imposing incentive-compatibility are not without loss generality. If, however, only direct, level-k-incentive-c...