We solve the stochastic generalized Nash equilibrium (SGNE) problem in merely monotone games with expected value cost functions. Specifically, we present first distributed SGNE-seeking algorithm for that require one proximal computation (e.g., projection step) and pseudogradient evaluation per iteration. Our main contribution is to extend relaxed forward–backward operator splitting by Malitsky ...

The satisficing approach is generalized and applied to finite n-person games. Based on direct elicitation of aspirations, we formally define the concept of satisficing, which does not exclude (prior-free) optimality but includes it as a border case. We also review some experiments on strategic games illustrating and partly supporting our theoretical approach. JEL classification: C72; C92; D01

We consider games played on an infinite probabilistic arena where the first player aims at satisfying generalized Büchi objectives almost surely, i.e., with probability one. We provide a fixpoint characterization of the winning sets and associated winning strategies in the case where the arena satisfies the finite-attractor property. From this we directly deduce the decidability of these games ...

We derive the existence of a Walras equilibrium (WE) directly from Nash’s theorem on noncooperative games. No price player is involved, nor are generalized games. Instead we use a variant of the Shapley–Shubik trading-post game. © 2003 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.

Interval games are an extension of cooperative coalitional games, in which players assumed to face payoff uncertainty. Characteristic functions thus assign a closed interval instead real number. This study revisits two game versions Shapley values (i.e., the value and Shapley-like value) characterizes them using axiomatic approach. For value, we show that existing axiomatization can be generali...

Numerous popular abstract strategy games ranging from hex and havannah to lines of action belong to the class of connection games. Still, very few complexity results on such games have been obtained since hex was proved pspace-complete in the early eighties. We study the complexity of two connection games among the most widely played. Namely, we prove that havannah and twixt are pspacecomplete....

Accurately reasoning about agents’ actions in strategic settings is a challenging artificial intelligence task. Many difficulties in learning to perform such reasoning arise due to the uncertainty in both agents’ motives and the strategic games being played. In this paper, we address the problem of learning from observations of the agents’ behavior in some games to predict play in different, bu...

In this paper, an existence result of quasi-equilibrium problem is proved and used to establish the existence of weighted Nash equilibria for constrained multi-criteria games under a generalized quasiconvexity condition and a coercivity type condition on the payoff functions. As consequence, we prove the existence of Pareto equilibria for constrained multi-criteria games with non-compact strate...

We observe that a significant class of Nash equilibrium problems in non-potential games can be associated with monotone inclusion problems. We propose splitting techniques to solve such problems and establish their convergence. Applications to generalized Nash equilibria, zero-sum games, and cyclic proximation problems are demonstrated.