The transformation of the economy to a low-carbon level is constrained by high costs and problem balancing interests in distribution these among participants. paper proposes use corporate game theory, particular Shapley value, for cost allocation. In contrast classical division additional utility cooperative games, this case are divided, concave function minimized. value coordinates determine c...

We examine the growth and welfare effects of parental leave subsidization in a life-cycle dynastic model with human capital externality. Such externality causes higher fertility, less time expenditure on child capital, lower than efficient levels. Efficient policies require subsidizing work leave, which includes labor income financed by lump-sum tax. Calibration based U.S. data implies that ful...

This paper presents an analysis of a multi-agent system intended to model total task completion rates in collaborating communities. The spillover effect is emergent. We begin to quantify externality of marginal utilities. We are concerned with maximizing the output of the given community through regulation of agent to task ratios. We outline emergent externalities when collaboration occurs, eve...

A debate opposes many accounting, finance, and economics researchers on investors’ need for disclosure regulation. Indeed, Healy and Palepu (2001) note that extent theory on voluntary disclosure shows that, absent market imperfections or externalities, firm managers have incentives to optimally trade off the costs and benefits of voluntary disclosure and to provide the efficient level of inform...

We study firms’investment in internal control to reduce accounting manipulation. We first show the peer pressure for manipulation: one manager manipulates more if he suspects that reports of peer firms are more likely to be manipulated. As a result, one firm’s investment in internal control has a positive externality on peer firms. It reduces its own manager’s manipulation, which, in turn, miti...

This paper studies the efficiency of competitive equilibria in environments with a moral hazard problem and unobserved states, both with retrading in ex post spot markets. The interaction between private information problems and the possibility of retrade creates an externality, unless preferences have special, restrictive properties. The externality is internalized by allowing agents to contra...

This paper focuses on a congestion externality in the labor market which is caused by non sequential search. A model is presented in which unemployment is caused by selection delays of the employers It is shown that the individual probability to get a job offer is increasing in the number of applications but that the aggregate hiring rate is decreasing in the average amount of applications per ...

Two Arrow–Debreu market games are formulated whose straightforward Nash equilibria are Walrasian. Both have an auctioneer setting prices to maximize net sales value. In the second an additional redistributive agency maximizes welfare through optimal lump-sum transfers. In intertemporal economies, however, subgame imperfections can arise because agents understand how current decisions such as th...

We analyze imperfect competition in dynamic environments where firms use rivalrous but nonexcludable industry-specific capital that is provided exogenously. Capital depreciation depends on utilization, so firms influence the evolution of the capital equipment through more or less intensive supply in the final-goods market. Strategic incentives stem from, (i) a dynamic externality, arising due t...