This paper provides evidence that inefficient promotion strategies and large wage increases upon promotion may both arise as a consequence of asymmetric employer information. We present a simple model that illustrates how both phenomena may jointly arise due to the information revealing character of promotions. Using experimental labor markets, we demonstrate that asymmetric employer informatio...

An unbiased employer engages in optimal sequential search by drawing from two equally quali…ed subpopulations of job candidates who di¤er in their “discourse systems.” That is, minorities convey noisier unbiased signals of ability than non-minorities. We show that when the employer is selective, minorities are underrepresented in the workforce, …red at greater rates, and underrepresented among ...

In July 2007, In Lee proposed an architecture for a next-generation holistic e-recruiting system. Based on an extensive review of marketing, recruiting and IS literature we propose to extend the framework by adding employer branding as a new important construct and sub process. It is shown how employer branding has to be integrated into the existing architecture to develop and implement an effe...

The employer-learning literature finds support for statistical discrimination on the basis of schooling. How economically relevant statistical discrimination is depends on how fast employers learn about workers’ productive types. This article is the first to estimate the speed of employer learning. Employers learn quickly. Initial expectation errors decline by 50% within 3 years. This estimate ...

The employee-employer relationship is an intricate one. In an industry, the employers expect to achieve performances in quality and production in order to earn profit, on the other side employees need good pay and all possible allowances and best advantages than any other industry. Our main objective of this paper is to analyze the relationship between employee and employer in workplace and dis...

OBJECTIVE To identify factors associated with small group employer participation in New Mexico's State Coverage Insurance (SCI) program. DATA SOURCES Telephone surveys of employers participating in SCI (N=269) and small employers who inquired about SCI (N=148) were fielded September 2008-January 2009. STUDY DESIGN Descriptive and multivariate analyses investigated differences between employ...

We ask whether the role of employer learning in the wage-setting process depends on skill type and skill importance to productivity. Combining data from the NLSY79 with O*NET data, we use Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery scores to measure seven distinct types of pre-market skills that employers cannot readily observe, and O*NET importance scores to measure the importance of each skill...

Varied as they may be, most U.S. readers of the Journal probably share at least one thing: employersponsored health insurance is vital to their wellbeing. For their part, most physicians, regardless of their field of medicine or where they practice, depend heavily on employer-sponsored insurance for their paychecks. Since increasing numbers of physicians today are employees of health care organ...

This paper jointly analyses the consequences of adverse selection and signalling on entry wages of skilled employees. It uses German linked employer employee panel data (LIAB) and introduces a measure for relative productivity of skilled job applicants based on apprenticeship wages. It shows that post-apprenticeship employer changers are a negative selection from the training firms’ point of vi...