Suppose an unpredictable evader is free to move around in a polygonal environment of arbitrary complexity that is under full camera surveillance. How many pursuers, each with the same maximum speed as the evader, are necessary and sufficient to guarantee a successful capture of the evader? The pursuers always know the evader's current position through the camera network, but need to physically ...

this paper aims to analyze the relationship among the employee, the employer, and the government with the help of game theory. the game among these three players is of the sort of static games with complete information and the strategies used by each player have been determined in the figure of tending to change the current situation and tending to keep it. the equilibrium among this three play...

The solution is given here for the infinitely repeated two-person zero-sum,games of inr complete information characterized by 2 X 2 games, with information matrxces b for the ftrst game and( b ab)for the second game.

This paper proposes a logical framework for representing and reasoning about imperfect information games. We first extend Game Description Language (GDL) with the standard epistemic operators provide it semantics based on state transition model. then demonstrate how to use language represent rules of an game formalize common properties as well properties. also show reason players' own each othe...

Games, such as Chess, Eight Queens, and Tiles Puzzle, have traditionally been used as popular benchmarks for evaluating different problem solving strategies. Many of the game benchmarks are suitable for evaluating static scheduling techniques. In such benchmarks, the scheduling phase and the execution phase (i.e. when the schedule is executed to play the game) are disjoint. The scheduling techn...

When we were being read fairy tails growing up, we first learned about games of “Complete information”. So the story goes, in such games, all n players know one another’s types, and use this information to somehow select and play one of the (possibly many) Nash equilibria of the game. To recap, a game G (here we will use costs rather than utilities, but it doesn’t matter) is defined by a set of...

This paper investigates whether behavior in a coordination game changes when subjects are limited to the information used by reinforcement learning algorithms. In the experiment subjects converge to an absorbing state at rates that are orders of magnitude faster than reinforcement learning algorithms, but slower than under complete information. Usually, this state is very close to a mutual best...

Recent price-of-anarchy analyses of games of complete information suggest that coarse correlated equilibria, which characterize outcomes resulting from no-regret learning dynamics, have near-optimal welfare. This work provides two main technical results that lift this conclusion to games of incomplete information, a.k.a., Bayesian games. First, near-optimal welfare in Bayesian games follows dir...

Recent price-of-anarchy analyses of games of complete information suggest that coarse correlated equilibria, which characterize outcomes resulting from no-regret learning dynamics, have near-optimal welfare. This work provides two main technical results that lift this conclusion to games of incomplete information, a.k.a., Bayesian games. First, near-optimal welfare in Bayesian games follows dir...