The integration of distributed energy resources (DERs), such as renewable (RE) and storage systems, can have many environmental economic benefits. sharing medium-scale DERs enhance these benefits by ensuring efficient resource utilisation promote economy economies scale opportunities. In this paper, we design a combinatorial double auction (CDA) for DER between multiple providers community cons...

The purpose of market design is to increase the efficiency of the market outcome by suppressing strategic behavior or rendering it ineffective. One part of this task is to eliminate loopholes in the procedural rules that might be exploited by a wily trader, but the more fundamental part is to devise rules that promote efficiency. In the case of an iterated multi-market auction, the key requirem...

We argue that on electronic markets, limit and market orders should have equal effective costs on average. This symmetry implies a linear relation between the bid-ask spread and the average impact of market orders. Our empirical observations on different markets are consistent with this hypothesis. We then use this relation to justify a simple, and hitherto unnoticed, proportionality relation b...

The paper develops a distributed systems architecture for dependable Internet based online auctions, meeting the requirements of data integrity, responsiveness, fairness and scalability. Current auction services essentially rely on a centralised auction server. Such an approach is fundamentally restrictive with respect to scalability. It is well-known that a tree-based, recursive design approac...

We consider auction games where, prior to the auction, bidders spend resources to increase their valuations. The market game is solved by solving an equivalent auxiliary social choice problem. We show that standard auctions are fully efficient, whereas reserve price requirements entail a double inefficiency. Moreover, we explain how optimal auctions differ from the well-known static optimum, an...

This paper inquires about the ability of double auction institutions to aggregate information in the context of a " common value " information structure that is known to produce the winner's curse in sealed bid environments. While many fundamental features of the economic environment are different from those studied in the context of sealed bids, the pattern of information distributed to the po...