The issue of systematization legislation is quite relevant and the task solving it part state legal policy. At same time, solution above problem impossible in isolation from study a number issues affecting both theoretical practical aspects lawmaking law enforcement activities. For example, one these key hierarchy normative acts, including those issued by bodies Russian Federation. standard-set...

I develop and estimate a model of expertise that weighs the tradeoffs of delegating loan decisions to loan officers. While loan officers can screen soft information, their preferences may distort decisions away from the lender’s objective. The model features rich heterogeneity (e.g. risk aversion, willingness to exert effort, and overconfidence) and addresses possible endogeneity with a natural...

We study the optimal design of incentive contracts for experts in different collusion environments, and explore implications for the organization of delegated expertise. We consider a principal relying on experts to gather and report two signals about a project’s value. The principal can have a single expert gather both signals or two experts gather one signal each. We show that absent collusio...

We extend a standard, rational expectation model of trade to incorporate the possibility of individual investors delegating their trades to an informed financial intermediary. In the presence of delegated trade, we show that a firm’s risk premium is a function of both the firm’s exposure to a common risk factor and idiosyncratic characteristics of the firm’s information environment. We show tha...

A principal delegates R&D to an agent when the researcher’s actions are unobservable. The optimal contract for delegated R&D is shown to take the form of an option. The principal and the agent are risk neutral and the agent is subject to limited liability. The principal makes an implementation decision after observing the quality of the invention. The discussion considers experimental design wi...

We examine the problem of setting optimal incentives to a portfolio manager (to be employed by an investor through a contract) making an ambiguity-robust portfolio choice with respect to estimation errors in expected returns. We consider a one-period model with a set of risky assets (with multivariate normal returns) whose expected returns are estimated with uncertainty and a linear sharing rul...

Whereas the oldest negotiation framework in distributed artiicial intelligence, the Contract Net metaphor, embodies a truly distributed negotiation procedure, some of the younger approaches to negotiation are distributed to a lesser degree, relying on a mediator to resolve connicts between agents. In this paper, we present delegated negotiation as a more distributed alternative for mediated neg...

In a typical corporate hierarchy, the manager is delegated the authority to make strategic decisions, and to contract with other employees. We study when such delegation can be optimal. In centralization, the owner retains the authority, which fails to motivate the manager to acquire valuable information, leading to suboptimal decisions and inefficient incentive provision to the worker. Benefic...