We show that the folk theorem generically holds for N -player repeated games with private monitoring when each player’s number of signals is su¢ ciently large. Neither cheap talk communication nor public randomization is necessary. Journal of Economic Literature Classi…cation Numbers: C72, C73, D82

This paper develops choice-theoretic foundations of the principal’s and agent’s behaviors that underlie the parameterized distribution formulation of agency theory. Both the principal and the agent are subjective expected utility maximizers and their actiondependent subjective probabilities are defined directly on the outcomes. The results are used to interpret and evaluate the common prior ass...

In the context of common agency adverse-selection games we illustrate that the revelation principle cannot be applied to study equilibria of the multi-principal games. We then demonstrate that an extension of the taxation principle – what we term the “delegation principle” – can be used to characterize the set of all common agency equilibria. JEL Classification: D82, L51.

Using administrative data from a large public university, we show that male students are 18.6 percent more likely than female to receive favorable grade changes made by instructors. Surveys of and instructors reveal regrade requests prevalent ask for regrades on the intensive margin. We corroborate gender differences in an incentivized controlled experiment: find males have higher willingness p...

We investigate information aggregation and competition in a delegation framework. An uninformed principal is unable to perform task herself must choose between one of two biased imperfectly informed experts. In the focal equilibrium, experts exaggerate their biases, anticipating an ideological winner’s curse. show that having second expert can benefit principal, even when equally or more than f...

I reconsider Stiglitz’s (1977) problem of monopolistic insurance with a continuum of types. Using a suitable transformation of control variables I obtain an analytical characterization of the optimal insurance policies. Closed form solutions and comparative statics results for special cases are provided. JEL: D42, D82

The Revenue Equivalence Theorem is generalized to the case of asymmetric auctions in which each player’s valuation is drawn independently from a common support according to his/her distribution function. r 2003 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. JEL classification: D44; D72; D82

We characterize the maximum payoff that a team can guarantee against another in a class of repeated games with imperfect monitoring. Our result relies on the optimal trade-off for the team between optimization of stage-payoffs and generation of signals for future correlation. JEL classification: C72, D82 Date: 11th May 2004. 1

Since its launch in 2009 much has been written about Bitcoin, cryptocurrencies, and blockchains. While the discussions initially took place mostly on blogs other popular media, we now are witnessing emergence of a growing body rigorous academic research these topics. By nature phenomenon analyzed, this spans many disciplines including macroeconomics, law economics, computer science. This survey...