A commonly alleged pitfall of decentralization is that poverty, socio-economic inequality and lack of political competition allow local elites to capture local governments. This hypothesis is empirically examined using a longitudinal sample of 89 West Bengal villages concerning targeting of credit, agricultural input kits, employment programs and fiscal grants spanning the period 1978–98. Highe...

This paper identifies matches on the male and female professional tennis tours in which one player faces a high payoff from being “on the bubble” of direct entry into one of the lucrative Grand Slam tournaments, while their opposition does not. Analyzing over 378,000 matches provides strong evidence for corrupt behavior on the men’s tour, as bubble players are substantially more likely to beat ...

We study the emergence and interaction of red tape and corruption in a principal–bureaucrat– agent hierarchy. The principal is to provide the agent with a unit of a good that involves externalities so that market mechanisms fail to achieve first best. Red tape produces information but is costly to the agent and is administered by a corrupt bureaucrat. First, the bureaucrat may extort bribes fro...

Many individuals are motivated to exert effort because they care about their jobs, rather than because there are monetary consequences to their actions. The intrinsic motivation of bureaucrats is the focus of this paper, and three primary results are shown. First, bureaucrats should be biased. Second, sometimes this bias takes the form of advocating for their clients more than would their princ...

Macro-level estimates of the productivity of public capital are typically larger than microlevel estimates. The evidence also shows large cross-country differences in the quality of public capital. A general equilibrium growth model is introduced to explain both facts. The productivity of firms specializing in differentiated intermediate inputs depends on public capital whose provision is subje...

Turf wars in organizations commonly occur in environments where competition undermines collaboration. We develop a game theoretic model and experimental test of turf wars. The model explores how team production incentives ex post affect team formation decisions ex ante. In the game, one agent decides whether to share jurisdiction over a project with other agents. Agents with jurisdiction decide...

This paper analyzes the impact of a group-size change on contributing incentives in repeated provision of pure public goods. We develop a model in which the group members interact repeatedly and might be temporarily constrained to contribute to the public goods production. We show that an increase in the group size generates two opposite effects – the standard free-riding effect and the novel l...

This paper links the theory of genetic algorithm (GA) learning to evolutionary game theory. It is shown that economic learning via genetic algorithms can be described as a speci"c form of an evolutionary game. It will be pointed out that GA learning results in a series of near Nash equilibria which during the learning process build up to "nally approach a neighborhood of an evolutionarily stabl...

Several new times of minimum light recorded with photoelectric means have been gathered for the early-type eccentric eclipsing binaries YY Sgr (P = 2. d63, e = 0.16), V523 Sgr (2. d32, 0.16), V1647 Sgr (3. d28, 0.41), V2283 Sgr (3. d47, 0.49) and V760 Sco (1. d73, 0.03). The O − C diagrams are analyzed using all reliable timings found in the literature and improved values for the elements of th...

Bu çalışmada, temsilî bürokrasi kavramının gelişimi ve toplumsal farklılıkların içerisinde temsilinin önemli sonuçlarından birisi olan bürokrasinin meşruiyeti üzerindeki etkisi teorik olarak araştırılmıştır. Temsilî kavramı, bürokrasinin, siyasal iktidarın değişimi ihtimaline karşı mevcut sınıfsal yapısının korunması için icat edilmiş bir kavramdır. Kavram, temel hedefleri sabit kalacak şekilde...