We study how norms can solve distributional conflict inside a clan and the efficient coordination of collective action in a conflict with an external enemy. We characterize a fully non-cooperative equilibrium in a finite game in which a self-enforcing norm coordinates the members on efficient collective action and on a peaceful distribution of the returns of collective action. JEL Classificatio...

Within the framework of pure redistribution (dividing one unit of a homogeneous good among identical individuals), the paper analyses the redistribution that arises from Downsian, two-party, electoral competition. It appears that the strategic behavior of vote-maximizing parties leads them to propose divisions which are not far from the egalitarian one. Journal of Economic Literature Classifica...

In this paper, we analyze a multiple winner rent-seeking contest where the number of winners is set by a self-interested regulator. The winners receive a license to compete in a market. The structure of competition in the market influences the number of winners through the preferences of the regulator. The model indicates that Cournot competitors can be better off than firms that are able to co...

Do political elites use armed groups to foster civilian participation in genocidal violence? Are employed strategically? How do they mobilize civilians? I investigate these questions using data from the Rwandan Genocide. To establish causality, exploit exogenous variation groups’ transport costs induced by weather fluctuations: shortest distance of each village main road interacted with rainfal...

Partisanship of state governors affects the efficacy US federal fiscal policy. Using close election data, we find partisan differences in marginal propensity to spend intergovernmental transfers: Republican less than Democratic governors. Correspondingly, Republican-led states have lower debt, (delayed) taxes, and initially economic activity. A New Keynesian model a monetary union implies sizab...

Can information and communication technologies help citizens monitor their elections? We analyze a large-scale field experiment designed to answer this question in Colombia. leveraged Facebook advertisements sent over 4 million potential voters encourage citizen reporting of electoral irregularities. also cross-randomized whether candidates were informed about the campaign subset municipalities...

Abstract We present a public procurement model in which contractual flexibility and political tolerance for deviations determine renegotiations. In the model, allows adaptation without formal renegotiation, while decreases with competition. then compare renegotiation rates of contracts procurer is either administration or private corporation. find robust evidence consistent predictions: public-...

We investigate the susceptibility of democracies to demagogues, studying tensions between representatives who guard voters’ long-run interests and demagogues cater short-run desires. Parties propose consumption investment. Voters base choices on current-period valence shocks. Younger/poorer economies economically disadvantaged voters are attracted demagogue’s disinvestment policies, forcing far...

We measure how a network of heroes can legitimize and diffuse extreme political behaviors. exploit newly declassified intelligence files, novel voting data, regimental histories to show that home municipalities French line regiments arbitrarily rotated under Philippe Pétain’s generalship through the heroic World War I battlefield Verdun diverge politically thereafter, particularly following own...

We investigate how the salience of an ethnic minority affects majority group’s voting behavior. use increased Muslim communities during Ramadan as a natural experiment. Exploiting exogenous variation in distance election dates to over 1980–2013 period Germany, our findings reveal polarization. Vote shares for both right- and left-wing extremist parties increase municipalities with mosques when ...