نتایج جستجو برای: d61

تعداد نتایج: 313  

2004
BRUNO S. FREY SIMON LUECHINGER ALOIS STUTZER Dina Pomeranz

This paper discusses a novel approach to elicit people’s preferences for public goods, namely the life satisfaction approach. Reported subjective well-being data are used to directly evaluate utility consequences of public goods. The strengths of this approach are compared to traditional approaches and identification issues are addressed. Moreover, it is applied to estimate utility losses cause...

2008
Donam Youm

We show that the modified Cardy-Verlinde formula without the Casimir effect term is satisfied by asymptotically flat charged black holes in arbitrary dimensions. Thermodynamic quantities of the charged black holes are shown to satisfy the energytemperature relation of a two-dimensional CFT, which supports the claim in our previous work (Phys. Rev. D61, 044013, hep-th/9910244) that thermodynamic...

2015
Yeon-Koo Che Olivier Tercieux

We study top trading cycles in a two-sided matching environment (Abdulkadiroglu and Sonmez (2003)) under the assumption that individuals’ preferences and objects’ priorities are drawn iid uniformly. The distributions of agents’ preferences and objects’ priorities remaining after a given round of TTC depend nontrivially on the exact history of the algorithm up to that round (and so need not be u...

2009
Martin Hellwig Martin F. Hellwig

This paper studies the design of optimal utilitarian mechanisms for an excludable public good. Excludability provides a basis for making people pay for admissions; the payments can be used for redistribution and/or funding. Whereas previous work assumed that admissions are governed by the payment or nonpayment of a price, this paper allows for arbitrary admission rules. With su¢ cient inequalit...

Journal: :J. Economic Theory 2004
Assaf Ben-Shoham Roberto Serrano Oscar Volij

Stochastic stability is applied to the problem of exchange. We analyze the stochastic stability of two dynamic trading processes in a simple housing market. In both models traders meet in pairs at random and exchange their houses when trade is mutually beneficial, but occasionally they make mistakes. The models differ in the probability of mistakes. When all mistakes are equally likely, the set...

2017
Christian P. Traeger Christian Traeger

The paper develops an analytic integrated assessment model of climate change (AIAM). The model enhances our current understanding of climate policy and explains crucial relations to the broader audience. Is the first quantitative analytic model comprising all the relevant components of its numeric deterministic counterparts used in policy advising. The model comes with a new framework to addres...

Journal: :J. Economic Theory 2003
Belén Jerez

We show that incentive efficient allocations in economies with adverse selection and moral hazard can be determined as optimal solutions to a linear programming problem and we use duality theory to obtain a complete characterization of the optima. Our dual analysis identifies welfare effects associated with the incentives of the agents to truthfully reveal their private information. Because the...

2004
Bruno S. Frey Alois Stutzer

This paper intends to provide an evaluation of where the economic research on happiness stands and in which interesting directions it might develop. First, the current state of the research on happiness in economics is briefly discussed. We emphasize the potential of happiness research in testing competing theories of individual behavior. Second, the crucial issue of causality is taken up illus...

2000
Nicholas E. Flores

Bergstrom showed that a necessary condition for a Pareto optimum with non-paternalistic altruism is classification as a selfish Pareto optimum. This paper shows that Bergstrom’s result does not generalize to the benefit-cost analysis of generic changes in public goods. There may exist good projects that will be rejected by a selfish-benefit cost test, a selfish test error. Selfish test error is...

Journal: :Games and Economic Behavior 2009
Guoqiang Tian

This paper deals with the problem of incentive mechanism design in non-convex production economies when production sets and preferences both are unknown to the designer. We consider Nash-implementation of loss-free, average cost, marginal cost, voluntary trading, and quantity-taking pricing equilibrium allocations in economies involving increasing returns to scale or more general types of non-c...

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