This paper playfully appropriates the metaphor of delusional states to frame a discussion hyperreal documents present in Disney theme parks and resorts. A brief overview literature on delusion individuals transitions into collective formation positive illusions introduce concept play. The conceptual framework play culture, or ludics, is presented understand cultural production meaning, which fu...

A co-actor's intentionality has been suggested to be a key modulating factor for joint action effects like the joint Simon effect (JSE). However, in previous studies intentionality has often been confounded with agency defined as perceiving the initiator of an action as being the causal source of the action. The aim of the present study was to disentangle the role of agency and intentionality a...

This article can be viewed as an attempt to explore the consequences of two propositions. (1) Intentionality in human beings (and animals) is a product of causal features of the brain I assume this is an empirical fact about the actual causal relations between mental processes and brains It says simply that certain brain processes are sufficient for intentionality. (2) Instantiating a computer ...

The role of the manager within the company is not a long quiet river, purpose rather a turbulent river in which the manager must have the capacity for adaptation to live in harmony the permanent change or the only certainty that we can have is that the company will continue to change, especially with the digital transformation and artificial intelligence. The main purpose of our article consist...

Horgan and Tienson (2002) argue that some intentional content is constitutively determined by phenomenology alone. We argue that this would require a certain kind of covariation of phenomenal states and intentional states which is not established by Horgan and Tienson’s arguments. We make the case that there is inadequate reason to think phenomenology determines perceptual belief, and that ther...

Abstract There are two notions of intentionality: the first contains thesis that our acts thinking, judging and loving have a content; second mental about something external to act. Brentano uses term ‘intentionality’ only in relation notion; for him, intentionality does not function as bridge between mind world. Is it possible phenomenologist like give an account notion intentionality? It is a...

How does group memory affect sociality? Most computational multi-agent social simulation models are designed with agents lacking explicit internal information-processing structure in terms of basic cognitive elements. In particular, memory is usually not explicitly modeled. We present initial results from a new prototype called “Wetlands”, designed to investigate the effect of group memory stru...