The fuzzy coalition game theory brings a more realistic tools for the mathematical modelling of the negotiation process and its results. In this paper we limit our attention to the fuzzy extension of the simple model of coalition games with side-payments, and in the frame of this model we study one of the elementary concepts of the coalition game theory, namely its "additivities", i.e., superad...

A game of threats on a finite set of players, N , is a function d that assigns a real number to any coalition, S ⊆ N , such that d(S) = −d(N \S). A game of threats is not necessarily a coalitional game as it may fail to satisfy the condition d(∅) = 0. We show that analogs of the classic Shapley axioms for coaltional games determine a unique value for games of threats. This value assigns to each...

A new player, e.g., an entrant, joining an existing game generally allows more value to be created, but also creates new alternatives for existing players. Greater value expands the range of equilibrium appropriation levels for an existing player, in particular, lowering the minimum equilibrium appropriation. The emergence of new alternatives has the opposite e¤ect. We say a player has competit...

We provide a model of coalitional bargaining with claims in order to solve games with non-transferable utilities and externalities. We show that, for each such game, payoff configurations exist which will not be renegotiated. In the ordinal game derived from these payoff configurations, we can find a partition in which no group of players has an incentive to jointly change their coalitions. For...

Games on lattices generalize classical cooperative games (coalitional games), bi-cooperative games, multichoice games, etc., and provide a general framework to define actions of players in a cooperative game. We provide here an axiomatization of the Shapley value and interaction index for such games.

A coalitional game is residential to study the actions of the rational mobile nodes for supportive packet delivery. We consider the problem of supportive packet delivery to mobile nodes in a cross wireless mobile network, where both wired and wireless network communications are used. A group of mobile nodes makes a conclusion to join or to leave a coalition based on their creature payoffs . The...

One key question in cooperative game theory is that of coalitional stability. A coalition in such games is stable when no subset of the agents in it has a rational incentive to leave the coalition. Finding a division of the gains of the coalition (an imputation) lies at the heart of many cooperative game theory solution concepts, the most prominent of which is the core. However, some coalitiona...

This paper extends the concept of coalitional rationalizability of Ambrus(01) to incorporate sequential rationality in multi-stage games with observable actions and incomplete information. Agreements among players are implicit, it is assumed that players cannot communicate with each other during the game. They re°ect a reasoning procedure which entails restricting strategies in a mutually advan...