I would like to thank Sridhar Ventakapuram, Daniel Goldberg, and Lachlan Forrow for thoughtful responses to my article (1–4). All endorse my main point, that conditioning the very aid that patients need in order to become healthier on their success in becoming healthier is (usually) wrong. They may think me, however, too friendly to an approach that gives patients “carrots” or “sticks” dependin...

The opinions expressed in this paper do not necessarily reflect the position of Summary This paper examines stability of international climate agreements for carbon abatement under an optimal transfer rule and renegotiations. The optimal transfer rule suggested to stabilise international environmental agreements (Weikard 2005, Carraro, Eyckmans and Finus 2006) is no longer optimal when agreemen...

The paper examines the impact of external pressure in act onboarding trading partners to business-to-business (B2B) connectivity platforms. Articulating different forms (enticement and enforcement) drawing on a survey 121 organizations, it effect three enticement factors enforcement firms’ decision adopt B2B platform. In general, measures (“sticks”) were found be more effective than (“carrots”)...

Annual forest loss in the Brazilian Amazon had in 2012 declined to less than 5,000 sqkm, from over 27,000 in 2004. Mounting empirical evidence suggests that changes in Brazilian law enforcement strategy and the related governance system may account for a large share of the overall success in curbing deforestation rates. At the same time, Brazil is experimenting with alternative approaches to co...

S AFETY-NET HOSPITALS (SNHS) PROVIDE A DISproportionate share of care to uninsured and Medicaid patients. Because they have few privately insured patients, SNHs cannot cover the costs of uncompensated care for the uninsured by charging higher fees to insured patients. As a result of the heavy burden of uncompensated care for the uninsured and inadequate Medicaid reimbursement rates, most SNHs h...

Monitors can be useful to the principal in controlling the agent. However, in such an hierarchical organizational, monitors will also have an incentive to collude with the agent. We consider a static model where an auditor is hired to monitor an empire building manager. We start by allowing unrestricted and enforceable side-contracting between the manager and the auditor. While this model predi...