Trusting beliefs — a players’ subjective probability of not being cheated — can be exploited. However, if a trustful player is cheated too often, she should change her belief and start trusting less, until her beliefs are correct. For this reason we model trust as an equilibrium phenomenon. Players receive an offer to transact and choose whether or not to cheat and steal the entire surplus. Che...

• A retrospective analysis was performed using the French national hospital database (PMSI), an exhaustive hospital discharge database that covers all hospital stays in public and private hospitals in France. For each hospital stay, the PMSI provides a compilation of administrative data (i.e. age, gender, residence code) and medical data (i.e. diagnosis, medical procedures performed during hosp...

BACKGROUND & OBJECTIVES The aim of this study was to assess the economic burden of hospitalisations for metastatic renal cell carcinoma (mRCC), to describe the patterns of prescribing expensive drugs and to explore the impact of geographic and socio-demographic factors on the use of these drugs. METHODS We performed a retrospective analysis from the French national hospitals database. Hospita...

We analyze the problem of fully implementing a social choice set in ex post equilibrium. We identify an ex post monotonicity condition that is necessary and in economic environments su¢ cient for full implementation in ex post equilibrium. We also identify an ex post monotonicity no veto condition that is su¢ cient. Ex post monotonicity is satis…ed in all single crossing environments with stric...

This paper examines an equilibrium model of social memory — a society’s vicarious beliefs about its past. We show how social memory can be incorrect in a well defined sense, and that incorrect social memory is a key ingredient in creating and perpetuating destructive conflicts between nations. We analyze an infinite-horizon model in which two countries face off each period in a game of conflict...

It is well-known that mechanism design literature makes many simplifying informational assumptions in particular in terms of common knowledge of the environment among players. In this paper, we introduce a notion of continuous implementation and characterize when a social choice function is continuously implementable. More specifically, we say that a social choice function is continuously (part...

Optimal resource allocation by means of the price mechanism is one of the main duties of the economics. Optimum allocation is sometimes realized not through the price mechanism, but via assignment algorithms due to an insufficient number of agents on either side of the exchange. Facing the same problem, the kidney market may be considered as a type of market failure that calls for market design...