We provide a new interpretation of the Nash bargaining solution, using fictitious play. Based on the finding that the Nash demand game has the fictitious play property and that almost every fictitious play process and its associated belief path converge to a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium in the Nash demand game (In, 2014), we present two initial demand games which exactly and approximately imp...

Most research in economics studies agents somehow motivated by outcomes. Here, we study agents motivated by procedures instead, where procedures are defined independently of an outcome. To that end, we design procedures which yield the same expected outcomes or carry the same information on others’ intentions while they have different outcomeinvariant properties. Agents are experimentally confi...

In the college admissions problem, we consider the incentives confronting agents who face the prospect of being matched by a random stable mechanism. We provide a fairly complete characterization of ordinal equilbria. Namely, every ordinal equilibrium yields a degenerate probability distribution. Furthermore, individual rationality is a necessary and su¢ cient condition for an equilibrium outco...

Men’s and women’s preferences are intercorrelated to the extent that men rank highly those women who rank them highly. Intercorrelation plays an important but overlooked role in determining outcomes of matching mechanisms. We study via simulation the effect of intercorrelated preferences on men’s and women’s aggregate satisfaction with the outcome of the Gale-Shapley matching mechanism. We conc...

A new metallofullerene Y(3)N@C(78)-C(2) was synthesized and characterized. It was shown that Y(3)N@C(78) has an unconventional C(78)-C(2) cage with two pairs of fused pentagons closely bonded with two yttrium atoms. DFT calculations showed that the size of the ionic radii of the metals forming the caged cluster plays an important role in the non-isolated-pentagon-rule-feature of the C(78) cage.

We analyze a simple arbitration procedure which is a multi-stage variant of Nash's demand game. In the absence of discounting, all Nash equilibria of the game yield the egalitarian solution in the first stage. The crucial feature of our arbitration procedure is that, in the case of incompatible demands, the game is allowed to continue and the player who demands the higher gain over the disagree...

We consider a Rothschild-Stiglitz-Spence labour market model and employ a centralised mechanism to coordinate the efficient matching of workers to firms. This mechanism can be thought of as operated by a recruitment agency, an employment office or head hunter. In a centralised descending-bid, multi-item procurement auction, workers submit wage-bids for each job and are assigned stable jobs as e...

A new game theoretic analysis of finite horizon, complete information bargaining is advanced. The extensive form reflects an attempt to model unstructured negotiations, in which the negotiants can gain no artificial advantage from the details of the bargaining protocol. Conditions are identified under which the game is dominance solvable in the sense that iterative deletion of weakly dominated ...