We present a result on approximate ex-post stability of Bayes-Nash equilibria in semi-anonymous Bayesian games with a large finite number of players. The result allows players’ action and type spaces to be general compact metric spaces, thus extending a result by Kalai (2004). Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72

This paper proposes the solution concept of interim correlated rationalizability, and shows that all types that have the same hierarchies of beliefs have the same set of interim correlated rationalizable outcomes. This solution concept characterizes common certainty of rationality in the universal type space. JEL Classi…cation and keywords: C70, C72, rationalizability, incomplete information, c...

We present a class of games with a pure strategy being strictly dominated by another pure strategy such that the former survives along solutions of the Brown–von Neumann–Nash dynamics from an open set of initial conditions. JEL classification: C72

We introduce a core-based stability concept for networks with widespread externalities. The model is a generalisation of the recursive core for partition function form games. We present a simple example of a favour network and show that the core is nonempty when players must pay transfers to intermediaries. This simple setting also models economic situations such as airline networks. Subject cl...

We characterize the maximum payoff that a team can guarantee against another in a class of repeated games with imperfect monitoring. Our result relies on the optimal trade-off for the team between optimization of stage-payoffs and generation of signals for future correlation. JEL classification: C72, D82 Date: 11th May 2004. 1

For the connections model of strategic network formation, with two-way flow of information and without information decay, specific parameter configurations are given for which Nash networks do not exist. Moreover, existence and the scope of Nash network architectures are briefly discussed. JEL Classification Numbers C72 · D85

We show that bounded monopoly profits are essential for the uniqueness of the Bertrand paradox (zero profit) outcome. Otherwise, a folk theorem obtains for one-shot homogeneous product Bertrand games: any positive (but finite) payoff vector can be achieved in a symmetric mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium. JEL Numbers: D43, C72

This paper is a survey of the work in the Nash program for coalitional games, a research agenda proposed by Nash (1953) to bridge the gap between the non-cooperative and cooperative approaches to game theory. Journal of Economic Literature Classification: C71, C72, C78.

The paper reports computations on endohedral fullerene systems, combining the treatments of quantum chemistry and statistical mechanics. Relative concentrations of five isomers of Ca@C72 are presented as an illustration, using the Gibbs energy based on density-functional theory computations. Anharmonicity effects are probed on a simple model system of C6. The temperature-pressure stabilization ...

We address the question of existence of equilibrium in general timing games with complete information. Under weak assumptions, any two-player timing game has a Markov subgame perfect e-equilibrium, for each e40: This result is tight. For some classes of games (symmetric games, games with cumulative payoffs), stronger existence results are established. r 2004 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. J...