To get the items that a buyer wants in an Internet auction, he must search for the items through several auction sites. When the bidding starts, the buyer needs to connect to these auction sites frequently so that he can monitor the bid states and re-bid. A reserve-price auction reduces the number of connections, but this limits the user’s bidding strategy. Another problem is equity between the...

The increasing prevalence of auctions as a method of conducting a variety of transactions has promoted interest in modelling bidding behaviours with simulated agent models. The majority of popular research has focused on double auctions, i.e. auctions with multiple buyers and sellers. In this paper we investigate agent models of sealed bid auctions, i.e. single seller auctions where each buyer ...

Services providers, such as public healthcare systems and government agencies, are under tremendous pressure to reduce costs and improve service quality. Scheduling is an important managerial component which has considerable impact on both the costs and quality of services. Service providers need customers’ availability information to improve resource utilization. On the other hand, customers m...

In this research, we empirically investigate the payoff of aggressive bidding in an online auction. To address our research question, we use a unique and very rich dataset containing actual market transaction data for approximately 7,000 pay-per-bid auctions. Our research design allows us to isolate the impact of bidding aggressively in an attempt to signal a high valuation on the probability t...

To be successful in multi-attribute auction, agents must be capable of adapting to continuous changing bidding price. This paper presents a novel fuzzy attitude based bidding strategy (FA-Bid), which employs dual assessment technique i.e. assessment of multiple attributes of the goods as well as assessment of agents attitude (eagerness) to procure an item in automated auction. The assessment of...

Indicative bidding is a practice commonly used in sales of complex and very expensive assets. Theoretical analysis shows that efficient entry is not guaranteed under indicative bidding, since there is no equilibrium in which more qualified bidders are more likely to be selected for the final sale. Furthermore, there exist alternative bid procedures that, in theory at least, guarantee 100% effic...

We consider a firm buying a commodity from a spot market as raw material and selling a final product by submitting bids. Bidding opportunities (i.e., demand arrivals) are random, and the likelihood of winning bids (i.e., selling the product) depends on the bid price. The price of the commodity raw material is also stochastic. The objective of the firm is to jointly decide on the procurement and...

We study the effectiveness of a procurement mechanism of a buyer that bundles the product procurement with the technology acquisition. We analyze the bidding behavior of rational suppliers and predict the outcome of such a bundling strategy. Using the two-supplier case, we find that each supplier has a dominant bidding strategy for the technology provision that is independent from the bidding s...