In this paper, we investigate a noncooperative sequential bargaining game for allowing a group of agents agents to partition themselves into non-overlapping coalitions. We focus on the issue of how a player’s position on the bargaining agenda affects his power. We also analyse the relationship between the distribution of the power of individual players, the level of democracy, and the welfare e...

Who Pays for It? The Heterogeneous Wage Effects of Employment Protection Legislation Theory predicts that the wage effects of government-mandated severance payments depend on workers’ and firms’ relative bargaining power. This paper estimates the effect of employment protection legislation (EPL) on workers’ individual wages in a quasi-experimental setting, exploiting a reform that introduced un...

On the Optimality of a Minimum Wage: New Insights from Optimal Tax Theory We build a theoretical model to study whether a minimum wage can be welfare-improving if it is implemented in conjunction with an optimized nonlinear income tax. We consider this issue in a framework where search frictions on the labor market generate unemployment. Workers differ in productivity. The government does not o...

This paper examines the distributional consequences of the recent transformation of the industrial relations system in Australia, with a shift from a collective bargaining system with comprehensive involvement of trade unions at both the national and industry levels to a system based on workplace bargaining with no union involvement. The paper presents the results of regression analyses which r...

Building on Genicot and Ray (2006) we develop a model on non-cooperative bargaining that combines the two main approaches in the literature of contracting with externalities: the o¤er game (in which the principal makes simultaneous o¤ers to the agents) and the bidding game (in which the agents make simultaneous o¤ers to the principal). Allowing for agent coordination, we show that the outcome o...

This paper investigates the efficiency of incomplete contracts if the investors have heterogenous preferences implying heterogenous bargaining behavior, and if these preferences are private information. In the hold-up problem, incomplete contracts cause the proceeds of the investments to be shared by bargaining. Fair-minded individuals reject positive but unfair offers even if this causes a bar...

c Centre d'études prospectives et d'informations internationales (CEPII), France a b s t r a c t a r t i c l e i n f o JEL classification: F14 F23 J5 Keywords: Worker bargaining power Labor market imperfections Outsourcing Multinational firms Do variations in labor market institutions affect the cross-border organization of the firm? Using firm-level data on multinationals located in France, we...

This paper considers the effects of joint negotiation when suppliers and intermediaries engage in bilateral negotiation over inclusion of a supplier’s product in an intermediary’s network. I identify conditions under which joint negotiation by two suppliers increases the suppliers’ bargaining power even when the suppliers’ products are not substitutes for each other. In particular, joint negoti...

The 'watch dog' role of the media, the impact of migration processes, health care access for children in developing countries, mitigation of the effects of Global Warming are typical examples of governance issues – issues to be tackled at the base; issues to be solved by creating and implementing effective policy. students to pave the road for innovative policy developments in Europe and the wo...