We propose two simple mechanisms that implement two bargaining sets in super-additive environments. The first bargaining set is a close variation of the one Ž . proposed by L. Zhou 1994, Games Econom. Beha ̈. 6, 512]526 , and the second is Ž the Pareto optimum payoffs of the A. Mas-Colell 1989, J. Math. Econom. 18, . 129]139 bargaining set. We adopt a simple framework in which the cooperative ou...

We provide a new interpretation of the Nash bargaining solution, using fictitious play. Based on the finding that the Nash demand game has the fictitious play property and that almost every fictitious play process and its associated belief path converge to a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium in the Nash demand game (In, 2014), we present two initial demand games which exactly and approximately imp...

In this paper, we propose a refinement of the subgame perfect equilibrium concept for infinitely repeated games, selection-consistent perfect equilibrium. This concept reflects the idea that players may not expect future bargaining power to be correlated with bygone actions. The equilibrium payoff set is generated by equilibria with a simple recursive structure. When discounting tends to zero, ...

Due to their many applications, large Bayesian games have been a subject of growing interest in game theory and related fields. But to a large extent, models (1) have been restricted to one-shot interaction, (2) are based on an assumption that player types are independent, and (3) assume that the number of players is known. The current paper develops a general theory of repeated large Bayesian ...